

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

CAPTURING NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD  
OPERATIONS:  
CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCES' INTERDEPENDENCE  
WITH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2005

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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE <b>JUN 2005</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Capturing Non-Linear Battlefield Operations: Conventional Air Forces' Interdependence with Special Operations Forces</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL, 36112</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>see report</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>54</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAJOR CIHAK ENLISTED IN THE AIR FORCE IN 1982. AFTER COMPLETING BASIC MILITARY TRAINING, HE VOLUNTEERED FOR AND SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED PARARESCUE (PJ) TRAINING. MAJOR CIHAK HAD SEVERAL OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS AS A PJ BEFORE RETURNING TO THE PARARESCUE SCHOOL AS AN INSTRUCTOR. WHILE STILL SERVING AS AN INSTRUCTOR PJ, MAJOR CIHAK COMPLETED A BACHELOR OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND APPLIED FOR AND WAS ACCEPTED TO ATTEND OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOL (OTS). AFTER COMPLETING OTS, MAJOR CIHAK ATTENDED UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (UPT) AT COLUMBUS AFB, MS. SINCE GRADUATING FROM UPT, MAJOR CIHAK HAS HAD ASSIGNMENTS FLYING THE B-52, THE B-1 AND THE B-2. IN ADDITION TO HIS FLYING ASSIGNMENTS, MAJOR CIHAK SERVED FOR TWO YEARS AS AN AIR LIAISON OFFICER IN EUROPE. MAJOR CIHAK'S OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE INCLUDES OPERATION JOINT GUARD, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. MAJOR CIHAK HOLDS AN ASSOCIATES DEGREE IN SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS FROM THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF THE AIR FORCE, A BACHELOR OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION FROM SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, A MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN RELIGION FROM LIBERTY BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AND A MASTER OF MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART AND SCIENCE THROUGH AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. MAJOR CIHAK'S IS A CERTIFIED ADVANCED OPEN WATER AND RESCUE SCUBA DIVER, A MASTER PARACHUTIST WITH 171 FREEFALL AND STATIC LINE PARACHUTE JUMPS AND A SENIOR PILOT WITH OVER 3000 FLYING HOURS AND 57 COMBAT HOURS. MAJOR CIHAK IS MARRIED TO PATRICIA (PATTI) AND THEY CURRENTLY RESIDE IN MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA WITH THEIR FIVE CHILDREN; HEATHER (16), KIRSTEN (15), ANTON III (13), BRIANNE (9), AND JOEL (5).

## ***Acknowledgments***

WHEN I ORIGINALLY STARTED THIS PROJECT, I WAS INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCE COMMUNITY AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITY. MY CAREER PUT ME IN A UNIQUE POSITION. HAVING BEEN A PJ, AN ALO, AND A PILOT OF ALL THREE HEAVY BOMBERS, I FELT A SENSE OF BELONGING TO BOTH THE CONVENTIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITY; I HAVE CALLED FOR BOMBS ON TARGET AND I HAVE DELIVERED BOMBS ON TARGET. I WANTED TO STUDY THE DYNAMICS AND THE WORKINGS OF THIS COMBINATION OF TWO SEEMINGLY OPPOSITE COMMUNITIES. BY STUDYING THE MARRIAGE OF THESE TWO COMMUNITIES I WAS, IN A SENSE, STUDYING MY OWN CAREER. BORN AND RAISED ON THE GROUND, I GREW WINGS, BUT NEVER FORGOT WHERE MY ROOTS DEVELOPED.

AS I RESEARCHED AND BEGAN TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF THIS MARRIAGE OF COMMUNITIES, I REALIZED THAT IT WAS MUCH DEEPER THAN JUST BATTLEFIELD INTEGRATION OF MY PAST. I BEGAN TO SEE THAT THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>, 2001 WERE THE IMPETUS FOR TRANSFORMATION. THIS TRANSFORMATION IS MORE THAN JUST CHANGING OUR FORCES AROUND TO DO MORE WITH LESS. IT IS TRANSFORMING A MILITARY STUCK IN THE DOGMA OF THE INDUSTRIAL AGE TO BECOME A MILITARY CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF MANEUVER WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE. THIS MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCE COMMUNITY AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITY PRODUCED NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS, THE FIRST FRUITS OF INFORMATION AGE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

MY SENSE OF GRATITUDE FOR HELP ON THIS PROJECT IS OVERWHELMING. IT IS FAR TOO EASY TO SIMPLY RECOGNIZE THE DOZEN OR SO PEOPLE WHO HAVE IMPACTED MY LIFE THIS PAST YEAR. IF I WERE TO DO SO, I WOULD FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE IMPACTED AND GUIDED MY DECISIONS FOR THE PAST FOUR DECADES. THEY HAVE HELPED ME EXPAND MY HORIZONS AND CHALLENGED ME TO THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX. THIS PAST YEAR HAS BEEN NO DIFFERENT; I HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED BY MY CLASSMATES AND THE SAASS FACULTY. SPECIFICALLY, DR. RICHARD ANDRES WHO'S PATIENCE WITH ME SEEMED ETERNAL AND WHO TAUGHT ME TO ASK THE WHY AND HOW QUESTIONS NO ONE LIKES TO ASK – OR ANSWER. ALSO PROFESSOR DREW, WHO'S MASTERY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE HELPED ME POLISH THIS WORK AND INSPIRED ME TO ACHIEVE A GREATER COMMAND OF THE LANGUAGE MYSELF. MANY OTHERS INFLUENCED THE WORDS OF THIS THESIS BUT ANY SHORTCOMINGS IN THE WORK ARE MINE ALONE.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, MY WIFE AND CHILDREN DESERVE MY DEEPEST THANKS FOR ONCE AGAIN PUTTING UP WITH A HUSBAND AND FATHER WHOSE WORK NEVER ENDS.

## ***Abstract***

AS THE UNITED STATES MILITARY TRANSFORMS FROM AN INDUSTRIAL AGE ORGANIZATION INTO AN INFORMATION AGE INSTITUTION, DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY SHOULD BE EVALUATED AND ADJUSTED IF NECESSARY TO MATCH INFORMATION AGE RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES AND MINDSET.

THIS THESIS USES HISTORICAL ANALYSIS TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: HOW CAN THE ENVIRONMENT BE CULTIVATED TO FOSTER THE NEXT GENERATION OF MANEUVER WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE? THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS ANALYSIS IS FOCUSED ON CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCE/SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE INTEGRATION AND INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS. THE ANALYSIS OF THESE OPERATIONS PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THESE TWO COMMUNITIES TO DETERMINE IF THERE ARE MISSION ENHANCEMENT QUALITIES FOUND IN INTEGRATED, INTERDEPENDENT AND HABITUAL RELATIONSHIPS. UNDERSTANDING THERE ARE VALUABLE CAPABILITIES DERIVED FROM THESE RELATIONSHIPS, THE FOCUS SHIFTS TO THE POST-MISSION SEGREGATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES THAT REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATES A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE FOUND IN LONG-TERM HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS AND ULTIMATELY HINDERS NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS.

RECENT COMBAT OPERATIONS INDICATE THE UNITED STATES' MILITARY MAY NO LONGER BE BOUND BY THE LIMITATIONS OF LINEAR WARFARE BUT IT IS NOW CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING OPERATIONAL LEVEL NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS ARE BECOMING THE MANEUVER WARFARE STANDARD BEARER FOR THE INFORMATION AGE MILITARY. THE CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCE (CAF) AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE (SOF) RELATIONSHIP AND INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS DEMONSTRATED DURING OEF AND SUBSEQUENTLY REFINED DURING OIF SERVE AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE JOINT OPERATIONS. SERVICE PAROCHIALISMS SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AND CAF/SOF INTERDEPENDENCE MAINTAINED THROUGH STRATEGIC LEVEL STAFF AND LEADERSHIP INTEGRATION.



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# Introduction

*BATTLES ARE WON BY SLAUGHTER AND MANEUVER. THE GREATER THE  
GENERAL, THE MORE HE CONTRIBUTES IN MANEUVER, THE LESS HE DEMANDS  
IN SLAUGHTER.*

*WINSTON CHURCHILL*

INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS FORMED THROUGH HABITUAL TRAINING ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) COMMUNITY AND THE CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCES (CAF) COMMUNITY. AGAIN AND AGAIN, TEAMS FROM THESE COMMUNITIES HAVE COME TOGETHER IN TIME OF NEED, OFTEN ACHIEVED SOMETHING FEW THOUGHT POSSIBLE, AND WERE THEN DISMEMBERED AND DISPERSED TO THE FOUR WINDS. ONLY MANY YEARS LATER WOULD THEY REUNITE AT A REUNION OF THE RETIRED.<sup>1</sup> THIS IS THE RECURRING THEME FOUND THROUGHOUT CAF/SOF OPERATIONS SPANNING THE PAST 60 YEARS. ONCE THE MISSION IS COMPLETED, THE TEAM IS BROKEN UP AND ITS MEMBERS ARE STOVEPIPED BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES.

THESE JOINT CAF/SOF WARFIGHTING TEAMS SYNTHESIZED UNIQUE CAPABILITIES. RECENTLY, DURING OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, THEY TOOK MANEUVER WARFARE INTO THE INFORMATION AGE AND TO A NEW LEVEL, NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS (NLBO). AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL JOHN JUMPER SUMMED IT UP WHEN HE SAID:

“OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM DEMONSTRATED THAT THE USAF IS THINKING ABOUT THINGS IN NEW WAYS – DELIVERING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FROM B-52S AIDED BY GLOBAL HAWK SENSOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND FORGING TIGHT LINKS BETWEEN SATELLITES, PILOTS IN THE AIR, SPECIAL FORCES ON THE GROUND, AND LAND FORCE COMMANDERS TO RAPIDLY PLOW A PATH THROUGH ENEMY DEFENSES.”<sup>2</sup>

SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF THE CAF/SOF COMMUNITIES REQUIRES AN UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS WHICH RESULTS FROM BOTH PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. OVER TIME THESE RELATIONSHIPS PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT BATTLEFIELD RELATIONSHIP CAPABLE OF PRODUCING NLBO. NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS OCCUR WHEN A MANEUVER FORCE PRECISELY ATTACKS AN OPPONENT THROUGHOUT THE SPECTRUM OF BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS IN BOTH TIME AND SPACE, AND FEATURE HIGHLY MANEUVERABLE GROUND FORCES LINKED WITH STRIKE

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<sup>1</sup> The author witnessed this first hand during the course of writing this thesis. The twenty-fifth anniversary of Operation Eagle Claw was commemorated recently at Hurlburt Field and Fort Walton Beach, Florida. This was the first time in twenty-five years many of the participants were together again in the same setting.

<sup>2</sup> John A. Tirpak and Adam J. Hebert, Air Force Magazine, *Toward a New Style of Warfare*, November 2003, Vol 86, No 11. on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.afa.org/magazine/nov2003/1103warfare.asp>.

AIRCRAFT. THESE GROUND FORCES ARE NOT ARRAYED IN A TRADITIONAL LINEAR FASHION BUT ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT AN ENTIRE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. THE AIR FORCES MAY NOT BE ASSIGNED A SPECIFIC TARGET PRIOR TO LAUNCH BUT MAY BE ASSIGNED A GROUND CONTROLLER TO SUPPORT. SUCH OPERATIONS CAN BE LETHAL TO AN OPPONENT WHO EITHER MASSES OR ARRAYS FORCES IN THE TRADITIONAL LINEAR MANNER.

## **Research Question**

THIS THESIS ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS AND HOW TO ENCOURAGE PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN CAF AND SOF UPON WHICH SUCH OPERATIONS MAY DEPEND. THE CAF/SOF INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP THAT DEVELOPED DURING OEF AND FURTHER REFINED DURING OIF IS USED AS THE MODEL FOR NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS.

## **Overview**

CHAPTER 1 REVIEWS EARLY INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE CAF AND SOF COMMUNITIES INCLUDING EXAMPLES FROM WWII, VIETNAM, IRAN AND IRAQ. CHAPTER 2 PROVIDES AN ANALYSIS OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND THE CAF/SOF INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP AS THE BASIS FOR NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. CHAPTER 3 CONTINUES THE DISCUSSION OF NLBO USING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AS A CASE STUDY WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON SENIOR LEADERSHIP'S RECOGNITION AND UTILIZATION OF THE CAF/SOF PARTNERSHIP. CHAPTER 4 DEMONSTRATES WHY RELATIONSHIP BUILDING AND STAFF INTEGRATION IS ESSENTIAL TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NLBO, AND HIGHLIGHTS HOW THESE CHANGES MEET RESISTANCE STEMMING FROM SERVICE DOCTRINE AND SERVICE PAROCHIALISM. THE CONCLUSION SYNTHESIZES THE KEY ASPECTS OF THE STUDY.



## **Chapter 1**

# **Conventional Air Force and Special Operations Early Interactions**

*TO YOU ALL FROM US ALL FOR HAVING THE GUTS TO TRY.*

*Anonymous British Soldier in the wake of the  
Desert One*

THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AIR FORCE (CAF) AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) IS RIDDLED WITH INTEGRATION PROBLEMS. PAST OPERATIONS INVOLVING BOTH COMMUNITIES ARE BEST DESCRIBED AS DECONFLICTED RATHER THAN INTEGRATED. EXAMPLES OF EARLY INTEGRATION INCLUDE THE GERMAN INTEGRATION OF STUKA DIVE BOMBERS AND GLIDERBORN TROOPS TO SEIZE AND HOLD THE STRATEGICALLY VITAL BELGIAN FORT EBEN EMAEL. A SECOND EXAMPLE, AND ONE THAT BECAME FOUNDATIONAL TO THE US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ETHOS, IS THE AMERICAN RAID ON THE PRISONER OF WAR (POW) CAMP AT SON TAY, VIETNAM. FOLLOWING EACH OF THESE OPERATIONS THE CAF/SOF TEAMS FORMED FOR THE MISSION WERE DISSOLVED AND THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WERE REINTEGRATED INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES. IN THE US MILITARY, THIS TREND OF FORMING AND DISBANDING SPECIAL TEAMS CONTINUES TO THE PRESENT DAY. IN ORDER TO BREAK THIS TREND A DISASTER WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1979 THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN WAS STORMED AND THE STAFF TAKEN HOSTAGE. FIVE MONTHS LATER, DURING AN ATTEMPTED HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION, DISASTER STRUCK AND EIGHT AMERICAN SERVICEMEN DIED IN THE IRANIAN DESERT AT A LOCATION KNOWN AS DESERT ONE. THE TRAGEDY OF THAT DAY SPURRED RADICAL CHANGES IN THE US MILITARY AND BECAME THE IMPETUS FOR THE CREATION OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM) IN 1986. THE FIRST

TEST OF THIS NEW COMMAND CAME FOUR SHORT YEARS LATER DURING DESERT STORM; BUT USSOCOM'S GREATEST ENEMY WAS NOT SO MUCH THE IRAQI MILITARY AS IT WAS THE AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE TIME. INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE CAF AND SOF COMMUNITIES DURING DESERT STORM WAS MINIMAL AT BEST AND IS BETTER DESCRIBED AS DECONFLICTED THAN INTEGRATED.

## **Early Integration**

IN THE EARLY YEARS OF AVIATION, OPERATIONS INVOLVING BOTH THE SOF AND CAF COMMUNITIES WERE TYPICALLY DECONFLICTED BUT AT TIMES THEY WERE INTEGRATED. DECONFLICTION OCCURRED WHEN EITHER COMMUNITY NEEDED TO CONDUCT A MISSION AND WANTED TO MAKE SURE FRIENDLY FORCES WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. INTEGRATION, ON THE OTHER HAND ONLY OCCURRED WHEN ONE COMMUNITY REQUIRED THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. IN THOSE CASES WHERE INTEGRATION WAS REQUIRED, IT ONLY OCCURRED FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION AND ONLY TO THE LEVEL NECESSARY FOR MISSION SUCCESS. DECONFLICTION AND INTEGRATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES WAS SHORT-LIVED AND LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC OPERATION. EVEN THOUGH INTEGRATION WAS RARELY ACHIEVED, THE TIMES WHEN INTEGRATION WAS UTILIZED, SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS WERE REALIZED.

### **Eben Emael**

ONE SUCH CASE OF EARLY INTEGRATION IS FOUND IN THE GERMAN ASSAULT ON FORT EBEN EMAEL AT THE START OF THEIR BLITZKRIEG ADVANCE THROUGH THE LOW COUNTRIES AND INTO FRANCE DURING WORLD WAR II. THE GERMANS SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED GLIDERBORN SOF SUPPORTED BY LUFTWAFFE STUKA DIVE BOMBERS TO ENABLE THE BLITZKRIEG INVASION OF BELGIUM AND FRANCE. ON 10 MAY, 1940 SIXTY-NINE GLIDERBORN GERMAN SOF SEIZED AND CONTROLLED THE BELGIUM FORT EBEN EMAEL.<sup>3</sup> IN THE ENSUING BATTLE, THE 650 BELGIANS IN THE FORTRESS DESPERATELY TRIED TO REGAIN CONTROL OF EBEN EMAEL BUT WERE REPULSED TIME AND AGAIN BY

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<sup>3</sup> The glider assault on Eben Emael was the first event during Operation Fall Gelb, the blitzkrieg into Belgium. Roger Edwards, *German Airborne Troops* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 71.

THE SOF FORCES SUPPORTED BY STUKA DIVE BOMBERS. IN THE MOMENTS AFTER THE INITIAL ASSAULT, "PREPLANNED BOMBER SUPPORT BEGAN TO ARRIVE ALMOST AS SOON AS THE GLIDERMEN HAD COMPLETED THEIR MISSION."<sup>4</sup> "WITH THE GERMAN POSITIONS MARKED BY PANELS, THE STUKAS BEGAN DROPPING BOMBS AGAINST SOME OF THE BELGIANS STILL PUTTING UP RESISTANCE."<sup>5</sup> THE INTEGRATION OF CAF IN SUPPORT OF THIS SOF MISSION WAS PLANNED IN ADVANCE BUT INTEGRATED TRAINING BETWEEN THE GLIDERMEN AND THE STUKA PILOTS WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION. THIS IS EVIDENT FROM THE LACK OF APPROPRIATE RADIO EQUIPMENT CARRIED BY THE GLIDERMEN TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE STUKAS. THE GLIDERMEN HAD TO RESORT TO MARKING THEIR POSITIONS WITH PANELS IN REPELLING THE BELGIAN COUNTERATTACKS.<sup>6</sup> OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT DAY AND A HALF BELGIAN FORCES TRIED TO RECAPTURE THE CASTLE BUT WERE REPELLED BY EITHER THE DIRECT FIRE OF THE GLIDERMEN OR THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) PROVIDED BY THE STUKAS.<sup>7</sup> AFTER TWO DAYS OF FAILED COUNTERATTACKS AND REALIZING THE INEVITABLE DEFEAT OF HIS FORCES, THE BELGIAN COMMANDER OF EBEN EMAEL SURRENDERED THE REMAINDER OF HIS 650 MEN TO THE GERMANS.<sup>8</sup> "THERE IS LITTLE DEBATE THAT THE ASSAULT ON EBEN EMAEL WAS ONE OF THE MOST DECISIVE VICTORIES IN THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS...SIXTY-NINE GERMAN GLIDERMEN ENGAGED AND SOUNDLY DEFEATED A BELGIAN FORCE TEN TIMES THEIR SIZE PROTECTED BY THE LARGEST FORT OF ITS DAY."<sup>9</sup>

THE SUCCESSFUL RAID ON EBEN EMAEL SECURED THE BRIDGE CROSSINGS NEEDED BY THE GERMANS TO CONDUCT THEIR BLITZKRIEG ATTACK ACROSS BELGIUM AND INTO FRANCE. UNFORTUNATELY THE SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE GERMAN GLIDERMEN AND THE GERMAN CAF WAS LOST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SURRENDER OF THE FORTRESS. THE GLIDERMEN WERE INTEGRATED BACK INTO THE 7<sup>TH</sup> AIR DIVISION AND 22<sup>ND</sup> AIRBORNE DIVISION, AND THE PILOTS OF THE JU 52S, GLIDERS, AND STUKAS WERE ASSIMILATED BACK INTO THE LUFTWAFFE.<sup>10</sup> THE

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<sup>4</sup> William H. McRaven, *SPEC OPS – Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996), 52-53.

<sup>5</sup> McRaven, 53.

<sup>6</sup> McRaven, 53.

<sup>7</sup> McRaven, 53-55.

<sup>8</sup> McRaven, 55.

<sup>9</sup> McRaven, 55.

<sup>10</sup> McRaven, 36.

## ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ASSAULT FORCE GRANITE AND THEIR INTEGRATION WITH GERMAN CAF BECAME A THING OF HISTORY.

### **Son Tay**

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SOF/CAF INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION CYCLE IS FOUND IN THE AMERICAN RAID ON THE POW CAMP LOCATED AT SON TAY, NORTH VIETNAM ON 21 NOVEMBER 1970.<sup>11</sup> WITHIN THE MILITARY COMMUNITY THIS RAID TOOK ON THE NAME, OPERATION KINGPIN. LEADING UP TO THE RAID, INTELLIGENCE IMAGERY INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN POWS AT THE CAMP JUST WEST OF HANOI.<sup>12</sup> INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE SOF AND CAF COMMUNITIES OCCURRED WITH THE INCORPORATION OF A-1 SKY RAIDERS INTO THE RESCUE PLAN. THEIR MISSION WAS TO ATTACK TWO BRIDGES NEAR THE CAMP THEREBY PREVENTING REINFORCEMENTS FROM ARRIVING. THEY ALSO PROVIDED COVER FOR THE HELICOPTER ASSAULT FORCE DURING THE INGRESS AND EGRESS PORTIONS OF THE MISSION.<sup>13</sup> OPERATION KINGPIN WAS A “SUCCESSFUL FAILURE.” THE ABSENCE OF PRISONERS AT SON TAY TARNISHED THE SUCCESSFUL PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF A COMPLEX POW RESCUE PLAN. HOWEVER, THE INTEGRATION OF CAF INTO SOF OPERATIONS PROVED ITSELF VALUABLE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE MISSION A REPORTED 36 SAMs WERE FIRED. TWO OF THE CAF AIRCRAFT WERE DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THOSE SAMs.<sup>14</sup> NONE OF THE HELICOPTERS WERE DAMAGED BY AAA OR SAMs. IN FACT, THE ONLY ASSAULT AIRCRAFT LOST DURING THE OPERATION WAS AN H-3 HELICOPTER WHEN ITS ROTOR BLADES STRUCK TREES DURING THE INFILTRATION PHASE.<sup>15</sup> THE HELICOPTER SUBSEQUENTLY CRASH LANDED AT ITS DESIGNATED INFILTRATION POINT AND THE

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<sup>11</sup> Otherwise known as Operation Kingpin it is described as “Operation Kingpin: The US Army Raid on Son Tay.” This description continues to propagate the service centric hurdles encountered when trying to go beyond liner battlefield operations. Major Ioannis Koskinas, *Black Hats and White Hats: The Effect of Organizational Culture and Institutional Identity on the 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force* (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2004), 48.

<sup>12</sup> McRaven, 287.

<sup>13</sup> The A-1’s dropped six Rockeyes and four White Phosphorous canisters (respectively) on the roads leading to and on a footbridge leading to the compound. Additionally, they attacked a vehicle bridge to prevent reinforcements from reaching the compound before the assault force was clear of the objective. McRaven, 314, 317.

<sup>14</sup> One F-105 supporting the mission in a SEAD role was damaged by a SAM. Its crew subsequently had to eject and were later picked up by the assault force during exfiltration. A second F-105 (Firebird 03) was damaged by a SAM and had to crash land on an airfield in Thailand. McRaven, 317.

<sup>15</sup> Pre-mission intelligence assessed the trees to be shorter than they actually were. McRaven, 312-313.



ASSAULT FORCE EXITED THE HELICOPTER AND COMPLETED THEIR MISSION. THE SKY RAIDERS ATTACKED THEIR TARGETS AND NO REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED AT THE POW CAMP UNTIL AFTER THE ASSAULT FORCE COMPLETED THEIR SEARCH FOR PRISONERS AND HAD DEPARTED THE CAMP. INTEGRATION OF CAF AND SOF HAD ONCE AGAIN PROVED VIABLE AND VALUABLE. SADLY THOUGH, AFTER RETURNING BACK TO THEIR BASES EACH OF SON TAY RAIDERS, LIKE THE GERMANS AT EBEN EMAEL, WERE ASSIMILATED BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES AND THE SYNERGISTIC CAPABILITIES OF THESE TWO COMMUNITIES WORKING TOGETHER WAS ONCE AGAIN LOST.

THESE TWO EXAMPLES REPRESENT THE MANY INSTANCES OF SOF AND CAF PERSONNEL CONDUCTING INTEGRATED ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE DIFFICULT OBJECTIVES WHILE MINIMIZING FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. AS THE MISSION NEEDS WERE DEVELOPED AND DEFINED, BRILLIANT TACTICAL MINDS RECOGNIZED SMALL SCALE INTEGRATION WAS REQUIRED FOR MISSION SUCCESS. HISTORICALLY, INTEGRATION OF CAF ASSETS FOCUSED ON TRADITIONAL CAS AND AI OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT SOF OPERATIONS. SADLY AFTER COMPLETING EACH SPECIAL MISSION, THE JOINT TEAMS WERE DISMEMBERED AND ABSORBED BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TIME FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE SYNERGISTIC CAPABILITIES DEVELOPED BY SOF/CAF TEAMS. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WOULD REQUIRE A DISASTER IN THE IRANIAN DESERT FOR THE US LEADERSHIP TO REALIZE THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A PREPARED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE AT THE READY.

## **The Phoenix**

THE FAILED HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT OF OPERATION EAGLE CLAW (OEC) AT DESERT ONE PROVIDED THE ASHES FROM WHICH USSOCOM HAS ITS BEGINNING AS A COMMAND.<sup>16</sup> THOSE ASHES OF DESERT ONE PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION AND MASONRY FOR A COMMAND CURRENTLY TASKED AS THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND IN

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<sup>16</sup> Operation Eagle Claw is the name given to the operational phase of the American attempt to rescue the American hostages held in Tehran, Iran. Other names associated with the rescue attempt include Operation Rice Bowl for the planning phase and Desert One for the location of the accident where 8 Americans lost their lives and the mission was terminated in failure. For further information about OEC see James H. Kyle and John R. Eidson, *Guts to Try*; Paul B. Ryan, *The Iranian rescue mission: why it failed*; and Tim Wells, *444 Days: The Hostages Remember*.

WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL TERRORISM.<sup>17</sup> THE ASHES ALSO HELP DEFINE THE CULTURE, CHARACTER AND VALUES OF USSOCOM AND PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DETERMINING WHAT AND WHY IT OPERATES THE WAY IT DOES.

AMERICA'S WAKE-UP CALL CAME ON 4 NOVEMBER, 1979 WHEN SUPPORTERS OF THE AYATOLLAH KHOMENI STORMED THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, IRAN AND CAPTURED SIXTY-THREE HOSTAGES.<sup>18</sup> AMERICA WAS STUNNED AND A SECRET *AD HOC* MULTI-SERVICE TASK FORCE WAS FORMED TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES SHOULD DIPLOMATIC MEANS FAIL. THE TASK FORCE WAS TO TRANSPORT AN ELITE COUNTERTERRORISM ARMY UNIT THAT HAD JUST COMPLETED CERTIFICATION TRAINING IN NOVEMBER OF 1979, TO THE EMBASSY AND THEN EXTRACT BOTH THE RESCUED HOSTAGES AND THE ELITE ARMY UNIT. THIS TASK FORCE DEMONSTRATED AMERICA'S RESOLVE AND COMMITMENT TO ITS CITIZENS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HIGHLIGHTED THE LIMITATIONS OF AMERICAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO THE WORLD.

TRAGICALLY, THE WORLD COMMUNITY WITNESSED THE EMBARRASSMENT AND APPARENT INEPTNESS OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN OEC TERMINATED IN FAILURE AT DESERT ONE FOLLOWING A FATAL ACCIDENT DEEP INSIDE IRAN. THE HOSTAGES WERE NOT RESCUED, AMERICANS DIED IN A FOREIGN LAND, AND AMERICA RECEIVED AN INTERNATIONAL BLACK EYE.<sup>19</sup> THE REALIZATION THAT AMERICA NEEDED A STANDING JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY BECAME APPARENT DURING THE ENSUING HOLLOWAY COMMISSION REPORT. THE FAILED RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOLLOWAY COMMISSION PROVIDED THE IMPETUS AND BASIS FOR THE CREATION OF A STANDING COUNTERTERRORIST JOINT TASK FORCE AND THE REVITALIZATION OF SOF.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> United State Special Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004; Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism, 3, on-line, Internet, 15 June 2005, available at [http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2003\\_2004\\_SOF\\_Posture\\_Statement.pdf](http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2003_2004_SOF_Posture_Statement.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> Koskinas, 98.

<sup>19</sup> On 24 April, 1980 after President Carter had already aborted the mission, one of the helicopters taxied into one of the parked C-130's. The ensuing fire killed 8 Joint Task Force personnel and embarrassed the United States in the international arena. Over time, a small number of the hostages were released but fifty-two were held captive until just moments after President Reagan was sworn in as President; a total of 444 days.

<sup>20</sup> Koskinas, 101.

CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE REVITALIZATION OF SOF WOULD EVENTUALLY GERMINATE INTO THE BIRTH OF USSOCOM ON 16 APRIL, 1987.<sup>21</sup> THE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE WAKE OF OEC MANDATED LIMITED INTEGRATION THROUGH JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND EVENTUALLY LED TO THE INCORPORATION OF SPECIALIZED CONVENTIONAL ASSETS. THOSE ASSETS THAT ROUTINELY AND REGULARLY TRAINED AND OPERATED IN THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITY, WERE INCORPORATED INTO USSOCOM. THE INCORPORATION OF CERTAIN CAF ASSETS INTO USSOCOM FOSTERED AND FACILITATED HABITUAL RELATIONSHIPS CRITICAL TO MISSION SUCCESS.<sup>22</sup> THE AC-130 SPECTRE GUNSHIP AND THE MC-130 COMBAT TALON AIRCRAFT REGULARLY SUPPORTED SOF OPERATIONS AND EVENTUALLY ACHIEVED FULL-SCALE INTEGRATION INTO THE SOF COMMUNITY WITH THEIR INCORPORATION INTO AFSOC. SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS RELIED UPON THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF AC-130 GUNSHIPS, BUT TYPICALLY DID NOT RELY UPON THEM AS A PRIMARY MEANS OF DIRECT ATTACK. EVEN AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF USSOCOM AND AFSOC, OTHER CAF INVOLVEMENT WAS CONSIDERED AN AFTERTHOUGHT AND GENERALLY REFERRED TO AND RELIED UPON AS CAS. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SOF COMMUNITY AND THE GUNSHIP COMMUNITY BECAME INTIMATE, WHEREAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOF COMMUNITY AND THE REST OF THE CAF REMAINED ELUSIVE, SPORADIC, AND ONLY THROUGH LIAISON CONTACTS. THE DIVERGENT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE GUNSHIP COMMUNITY AND THE REST OF THE CAF EVENTUALLY PULLED THE GUNSHIP COMMUNITY AWAY FROM THE CONVENTIONAL CAF AND CLOSER TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITY.<sup>23</sup> WITHIN A FEW YEARS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF USSOCOM, IRAQI LEADER SADDAM HUSSEIN INVADED KUWAIT AND THE US WAS ONCE AGAIN AT WAR.

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<sup>21</sup> General Charles R. Holland, "United States Special Operations Command History, 15<sup>th</sup> Anniversary," 16 April 2002. n.p., on-line, Internet, 8 June 2005, available at [http://www.socom.mil/Docs/15th\\_anniversary\\_history.pdf](http://www.socom.mil/Docs/15th_anniversary_history.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Habitual relationships is a term commonly used among special operations staff personnel to indicate an elevated level and amount of training conducted between organizations.

<sup>23</sup> The shift in relationship affiliations is confirmed when looking at the command structure of the Gunship community. Personnel assigned to AC-130 units are assigned to the Air Force Special Operations Command which is the Air Force service component to the USSOCOM.

## **Operation Desert Storm**

THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT TEST OF USSOCOM AND THE CAF/SOF INTEGRATION CAME AT THE BEGINNING OF 1991 DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM. ONE OF THE BIGGEST HURDLES IN THE WAY OF TRUE INTEGRATION WAS THE DEEP SUSPICION HELD BY MANY OF THE SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THAT TIME TOWARD ELITE FORCES. MANY OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE TIME HELD TO THE SAME BELIEF AS BRITAIN'S GREAT WORLD WAR II COMMANDER, GENERAL WILLIAM J. SLIM THAT "ARMIES DO NOT WIN WARS BY MEANS OF A FEW BODIES OF SUPER-SOLDIERS BUT BY THE AVERAGE QUALITY OF THEIR STANDARD UNITS."<sup>24</sup> ALSO, THE SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP AT THE TIME WAS STEEPED IN AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WANT SPECIAL OPERATORS RUNNING AROUND IRAQ WITHOUT DIRECT CONTROL OVER THEM. AS A RESULT, USSOCOM'S ROLE WAS MARGINALIZED AND A TRUE TEST OF CAF/SOF INTEGRATION WAS NOT PERMITTED DURING DESERT STORM.<sup>25</sup>

THE TWO LEADING GENERALS OF OPERATION DESERT STORM WERE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL COLIN POWELL AND CENTRAL COMMAND'S COMMANDER IN CHIEF, GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF. BOTH OF THESE GENERALS GREW UP IN THE VIETNAM ERA AND WERE DEEPLY EDUCATED AND FIRMLY ROOTED IN THE AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE.<sup>26</sup> THE AMERICAN AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE WAS BASED ON LINEAR MANEUVER WARFARE SUITABLE FOR FIGHTING THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EUROPE. ENVISIONED BATTLES TOOK PLACE BETWEEN MASSED FORCES TYPICALLY ALONG LINES OF CONTACT, A STYLE OF WARFARE COMMON IN EUROPE THROUGHOUT THE 19<sup>TH</sup> AND 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES.

IN GENERAL POWELL'S CASE, WHILE IN VIETNAM HE WITNESSED FIRST HAND THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PIECEMEALING AND GRADUALISM. IT BECAME HIS PERSONAL CAMPAIGN ALONG WITH MANY OTHERS OF THAT GENERATION TO MAKE SURE THE UNITED STATES HAD LEARNED THE LESSON THAT GRADUALISM WAS A

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<sup>24</sup> Rick Atkinson, *Crusade; The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1993), 142.

<sup>25</sup> Linda Robinson, *Masters of Chaos; the Secret History of the Special Forces* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 193.

<sup>26</sup> When President Bush appointed General Powell as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell was not only the youngest chairman but also the first African-American. He also held the distinction as being the first Chairman whose frame of reference was Vietnam not WWII or Korea. James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (Washington: Brassey's, 1997), 337.

FAILED POLICY.<sup>27</sup> GENERAL POWELL “WAS FROM A GENERATION OF GENERALS WHO BELIEVED THAT OVERWHELMING MILITARY FORCE WAS FOUND IN TROOP STRENGTH—SHEER NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS AND TANKS ON THE GROUND.”<sup>28</sup> HE PROMOTED A DOCTRINE OF OVERWHELMING FORCES WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEARLY 500,000 PERSONNEL TO THE GULF REGION TO REMOVE THE WORLD’S FOURTH LARGEST ARMY FROM KUWAIT.

GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF, AS THE COMBATANT COMMANDER, USED CLASSIC AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND THE NEARLY HALF MILLION PERSONNEL PROVIDED BY GENERAL POWELL’S DOCTRINE TO REMOVE THE IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT. SCHWARZKOPF “DISTRUSTED ANYTHING THAT COULD SUBVERT THE PRECISE TIMETABLE OF HIS FOUR-PHASE ATTACK—SUCH AS A FEW HUNDRED HEAVILY ARMED COMMANDOS CRASHING THROUGH IRAQ.”<sup>29</sup> ADDITIONALLY, HE HAD WITNESSED FIRST HAND THE FAILED SPECIAL OPERATIONS ATTEMPTS DURING THE AMERICAN INVASION OF GRENADA.<sup>30</sup> THE FAILURE OF SEVERAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS AND UNITS—including the LOSS OF AN ENTIRE SEAL TEAM DURING THE INITIAL ASSAULT ON GRENADA—IMPACTED GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF’S CONCEPT AND UTILIZATION OF SOF DURING DESERT STORM. AS A RESULT, HE MARGINALIZED SOF OPERATIONS, AND ALTHOUGH HE UTILIZED THE USSOCOM ASSETS DURING THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION, HE DID NOT ENCOURAGE THEM TO FULLY INTEGRATE NOR DID HE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS PROVIDED BY SOF OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE THEATER.

GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF’S MARGINALIZATION OF SOF WAS NEITHER UNPRECEDENTED NOR UNCOMMON. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES HISTORICALLY HAVE STRUGGLED FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECOGNITION. THE SECRETIVE NATURE OF SPECIAL MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES TENDS TO CAUSE A RIFT BETWEEN SOF AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, THE RELATIVE NUMBERS OF SOF AS COMPARED TO THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES HISTORICALLY LIMITS SENIOR OFFICER ADVANCEMENT, THEREBY LIMITING SOF REPRESENTATION AT SENIOR LEVELS. THE

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<sup>27</sup> Kitfield, 337.

<sup>28</sup> General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 394.

<sup>29</sup> Atkinson, 142.

<sup>30</sup> Kitfield, 264-265.

LACK OF SENIOR LEVEL REPRESENTATION CONSISTENTLY PLACES THE SOF COMMUNITY IN THE ROLE OF AN OUTSIDER, OFTEN CAUSING CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO OVERLOOK THEIR UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES.<sup>31</sup>

GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF “STOUTLY RESISTED MOST DIRECT ACTION SUGGESTIONS TO INSERT MEN BEHIND THE LINES.”<sup>32</sup> HE DEVELOPED A DECONFLICTED OPERATIONAL PLAN CONSISTING OF TWO SEPARATE CAMPAIGNS. THE FIRST WAS AN AIR CAMPAIGN CONSISTING OF HEAVY BOMBARDMENT AND PRECISION TARGETING WITH LASER-GUIDED MUNITIONS. THE SECOND WAS A GROUND-CENTRIC CAMPAIGN CLOSELY RESEMBLING THE TYPE OF WARFARE PUT FORTH IN AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE – THAT IS, GROUND WARFARE CLOSELY SUPPORTED BY AIR POWER. AFTER 43 DAYS OF AIR ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC TARGETS IN AND AROUND BAGHDAD, GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF LAUNCHED THE 100-HOUR GROUND CAMPAIGN.

ALTHOUGH HIS PLAN TO CONDUCT A MASSIVE FLANKING MANEUVER TO CUT OFF AND DESTROY THE IRAQI MILITARY WAS BRILLIANTLY EXECUTED, IT REMAINED IN THE REALM OF LINEAR COMBAT AND FOLLOWED AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE. AS A RESULT CAS MISSIONS DURING THE GROUND PORTION WERE DECONFLICTED AND RARELY INTEGRATED.<sup>33</sup> “SEVERAL FIXED-WING CAS OPERATIONS TOOK PLACE BETWEEN 25 AND 27 FEBRUARY 1991. THE FIRST INVOLVED SUPPORT OF THE 1<sup>ST</sup> ARMORED DIVISION OF THE VII CORPS, WHICH CAME IN CONTACT WITH IRAQI FORCES DURING ITS ADVANCE NORTH ON THE MORNING OF 25 FEBRUARY.”<sup>34</sup> THE 1<sup>ST</sup> AD CALLED IN FIXED-WING CAS STRIKES WHEN IT WAS 35 TO 40 MILES AWAY FROM ITS OBJECTIVE.<sup>35</sup> AS THEY CONTINUED TO MOVE CLOSER TO THEIR OBJECTIVE THEY NO LONGER CALLED UPON FIXED-WING CAF ASSETS FOR CAS, BUT INSTEAD RESORTED TO USING ARTILLERY, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AND TACTICAL MISSILE BATTERIES TO PROVIDE

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<sup>31</sup> Robinson, 193.

<sup>32</sup> Of more than sixty direct action proposals advanced by the Army’s 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, all but a handful were turned down. Atkinson, 180.

<sup>33</sup> General Myers comments looking back on Operation Desert Storm, “We were basically in a deconfliction mode.” Rebecca Grant, “Hand in Glove.” *Air Force Magazine*. n.p., online, Internet, 9 June 2005, available from <http://www.afa.org/magazine/july2003/0703glove.html>

<sup>34</sup> Lt Col. Aldon E. Purdham Jr., “America’s First Air Battles; Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost?” *The Cadre Papers* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, October 2003), 59.

<sup>35</sup> Frank N. Schubert, and Theresa L. Kraus, *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Storm* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1995), 186.

PREPARATORY FIRES.<sup>36</sup> A SECOND EXAMPLE OF DECONFLICTED CAS IS FOUND IN THE ACCOUNTS OF 2<sup>ND</sup> ARMORED CAVALRY. ON 26 FEBRUARY A-10S WERE CALLED IN TO STRIKE THE POSITIONS OF THE IRAQI TAWAKALNA DIVISION PRIOR TO WHAT CAME TO BE CALLED THE BATTLE OF 73 EASTING.<sup>37</sup> WHILE THESE SORTIES SERVED TO PREPARE THE BATTLE AREA, THEY DID NOT PROVIDE CAS DURING THE ACTUAL BATTLE ITSELF.<sup>38</sup> IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING OPERATION DESERT STORM, SOME WOULD USE THIS POOR INTEGRATION OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES AS A BASIS TO PROMOTE SERVICE PAROCHIALISM WHILE OTHERS WOULD USE IT TO ATTACK SERVICE PAROCHIALISM.

AFTER TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AIRPOWER PROPONENTS BEGAN THE PAROCHIAL RHETORIC. AT A MARCH 15, 1991 PENTAGON NEWS BRIEFING, THEN AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPeAK STATED "MY PRIVATE CONVICTION IS THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THAT A FIELD ARMY HAS BEEN DEFEATED BY AIRPOWER."<sup>39</sup> RICHARD HALLION IN HIS BOOK DECLARED, "SIMPLY (IF BOLDLY) STATED, AIR POWER WON THE GULF WAR."<sup>40</sup> MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT SCALES, NOT TO BE OUTDONE, ASSERTED IN THE ARMY'S OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE GULF WAR THAT "AS PART OF THE COALITION, THE AMERICAN ARMY DECISIVELY DEFEATED THE FOURTH LARGEST FIELD ARMY IN THE WORLD. IT DID SO AT THE LOWEST COST IN HUMAN LIFE EVER RECORDED FOR A CONFLICT OF SUCH MAGNITUDE."<sup>41</sup> ADDING TO THE ARGUMENT, DARYL PRESS A PROFESSOR AT DARTMOUTH DECLARED IN FALL 2001 EDITION OF *INTERNATIONAL SECURITY* THAT "AIRPOWER WAS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR SUFFICIENT FOR VICTORY IN THE GULF WAR."<sup>42</sup> IN A VERY DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE SITUATION, USAF MAJOR CRAIG WILLS STATED, "AIR AND SPACE POWER EFFECTIVELY PARALYZED, BLINDED, AND DESTROYED THE IRAQIS BEFORE THE GROUND WAR."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Schubert and Kraus, 186.

<sup>37</sup> Purdham, 59 and Eliot A. Cohen, "Command and Control," in vol. 1 pt. 2, Planning and Command and Control, *Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS)*, (Washington DC: GPO, 1993), 249.

<sup>38</sup> Purdham, 59.

<sup>39</sup> Grant, n.p.

<sup>40</sup> Richard P. Hallion, *Storm Over Iraq* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 1.

<sup>41</sup> Robert H. Scales Jr., *Certain Victory* (Washington: United States Army, 1993), 5.

<sup>42</sup> Daryl Press, "The Myth of Airpower in the Persian Gulf War," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No 2 (Fall 2001), 7.

<sup>43</sup> Major Craig Wills, *Airpower, Afghanistan, and the Future of Warfare: An Alternative View* (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2004), 28.

THIS CHAPTER BEGAN WITH A LOOK AT TWO SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES OF CAF/SOF INTEGRATION, THE GERMAN RAID ON FORT EBEN EMAEL IN BELGIUM AND THE AMERICAN RAID ON THE SON TAY POW CAMP IN VIETNAM. FOLLOWING THOSE EXAMPLES, THERE WAS A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE FORMATION OF USSOCOM OUT OF THE ASHES OF OPERATION EAGLE CLAW AND DESERT ONE. FINALLY THIS CHAPTER CONCLUDED WITH A QUICK EXPLANATION OF WHY SOF HAD A VERY LIMITED ROLE DURING DESERT STORM HIGHLIGHTING THE HIGHLY-CHARGED SERVICE-CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE TIME. THE INFANCY OF USSOCOM AS A COMMAND AND THE PREVALENT ATMOSPHERE OF SERVICE PAROCHIALISM LIMITED THE INTERACTION AND INTEGRATION OF THE CAF AND SOF COMMUNITIES DURING DESERT STORM.



## **Chapter 2**

### **Operation Enduring Freedom**

*WE HAVE AWAKENED A SLEEPING GIANT AND HAVE  
INSTILLED IN HIM A TERRIBLE RESOLVE.*

*Admiral Yamamoto.*

*ON MY ORDERS, THE UNITED STATES MILITARY HAS BEGUN  
STRIKES AGAINST AL QAEDA TRAINING CAMPS AND  
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OF THE TALIBAN REGIME IN  
AFGHANISTAN*

*President George W. Bush*

IN RESPONSE TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 THE UNITED STATES SOUGHT QUICK PUNISHMENT AND JUSTICE FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE. WITHIN DAYS, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND HIS AL QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK WERE DEEMED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS. SUBSEQUENT INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS INCORPORATING SOF AND CAF ASSETS DEMONSTRATED AN ADVANCED LEVEL MANEUVER WARFARE CAPABILITY AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL WITH OPERATIONAL EFFECTS AND STRATEGIC IMPACT. THOSE TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN PROVIDED THE CATALYST TO FORM AN INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CAF AND SOF. THIS NEWLY RECOGNIZED RELATIONSHIP PROVED LETHAL TO THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT, GENERATED IMMENSE DEBATE ON THE APPLICATION OF WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE AFGHAN MODEL OF WAR, AND SPURRED A TRANSFORMATION IN THINKING ABOUT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.

## **The Sleeping Giant Awakes**

FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2001, AMERICA FINALLY REALIZED THAT A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, AL QAEDA, HAD BEEN WAGING A WAR AGAINST IT FOR ALMOST 10 YEARS. AL QAEDA HAD FINALLY BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. NOT SINCE WORLD WAR II HAD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SO UNANIMOUSLY CHOSEN TO GO TO WAR. AL QAEDA, LED BY OSAMA BIN LADEN, WAS BASED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS, LAND-LOCKED COUNTRY OF AFGHANISTAN. IT HAD FOUND SANCTUARY WITHIN THE BORDERS OF AFGHANISTAN AND EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED THE AFGHAN TALIBAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH MULLAH OMAR. AL QAEDA AND THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT BECAME THE OBJECT OF AMERICA'S FIRST WAR OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT).<sup>44</sup>

"AFGHANISTAN HAS LONG BEEN THE BANE OF INVADING ARMIES – ALEXANDER THE GREAT STRUGGLED THERE, AND ATTEMPTS BY THE BRITISH AND SOVIET EMPIRES TO SUBDUE THE REGION FAILED MISERABLY."<sup>45</sup> AFGHANISTAN HAS A REPUTATION AS THE "GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES," AND MANY CRITICS AND ALARMIST BELIEVED THE US WOULD FARE NO BETTER THAN ANY OF THE PREVIOUS HEGEMONS.<sup>46</sup> IN THE PAST, THE EXTREME TERRAIN AND CLIMATE HAVE PROVEN TOO MUCH FOR INVADING ARMIES. THIS SAME TERRAIN AND CLIMATE APPEARS TO PERMIT AT BEST A LOOSE KNIT CONGLOMERATION OF WARRING TRIBES ACCUSTOMED TO FIGHTING FIRST A FOREIGN INVADER AND SECOND EACH OTHER.<sup>47</sup> SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PROVIDED THE GROUND ELEMENT NECESSARY TO ENGAGE AN ENEMY FORCE ADEPT AT FIGHTING MOUNTAINOUS GUERILLA WARFARE. BUT SOF LACKED THE MANPOWER AND ORGANIC FIREPOWER TO DEFEAT THE MILITARY FORCES OF AFGHANISTAN UNDER TALIBAN RULE

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<sup>44</sup> The War on Global Terrorism is spelled out in President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS). Bush, George W. *National Security Strategy* (Washington, 2004). In the NSS the current struggle against terrorism is discussed as the War on Global Terrorism. Common language has renamed the struggle as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This minor transposition of words may seem inconsequential at first, but in fact it modifies the meaning and focus of the efforts of the US. We are engaged in a war against organizations that employ terrorist tactics on an international or global scale.

<sup>45</sup> Wills, 46.

<sup>46</sup> Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires," *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2001, 13-30.

<sup>47</sup> The notion of peace was a new concept for most Afghans. They had known bloodshed and war their entire lives. The concept of peace was difficult for Afghans to grasp as evident from the comments of General Dostum in the months following the fall of the Taliban government. Franks, 326.

SUPPLEMENTED WITH AL QAEDA FIGHTERS. TO OVERCOME THE LONGSTANDING ASSUMPTION THAT A THREE-TO-ONE ADVANTAGE WAS NEEDED BY AN ATTACKING FORCE AND TO ACHIEVE LONG-TERM SUPERIORITY, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON INDIGENOUS FIGHTERS AND THE CONVENTIONAL CAF TO PROVIDE PERSISTENT FIREPOWER. "LATER KNOWN AS THE AFGHAN MODEL, THIS COMBINATION OF SOF, AIRPOWER, AND AN INDIGENOUS ALLY WAS WILDLY SUCCESSFUL."<sup>48</sup> IRONICALLY, THIS FORCE COMBINATION WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED ONLY TO PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD FOR DECISIVE OPERATIONS BY CONVENTIONAL ARMY TROOPS – NOT TO WIN THE WAR OUTRIGHT."<sup>49</sup> THE NECESSITY TO REACT QUICKLY TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 11 SEPTEMBER, 2001 IN A LAND-LOCKED MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY ISOLATED FROM ALLIES PROVIDED THE PERFECT ENVIRONMENT FOR THE SOF AND CAF COMMUNITIES TO COMBINE THEIR STRENGTHS AND ACHIEVE A NEW LEVEL OF MANEUVER WARFARE.

FIRST, THE NECESSITY TO REACT QUICKLY TO DEFEAT AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THEY DISPERSED PROVIDED AN IDEAL ENVIRONMENT FOR INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS BETWEEN CAF AND SOF. THE GREATEST MILITARY IN THE WORLD WOULD ENGAGE ONE OF THE WORST EQUIPPED AND TRAINED MILITARIES IN THE WORLD. GENERAL FRANKS DESCRIBED THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN AS A REVOLUTION IN WARFIGHTING. "WE (THE UNITED STATES) WOULD INTRODUCE THE MOST ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE WORLD...ONTO ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST PRIMITIVE BATTLEFIELDS."<sup>50</sup> ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES HAD THE GREATEST MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE WORLD, AT THE TIME IT WAS ILL PREPARED FOR ENGAGING AN ELUSIVE ENEMY IN THE HIGH ALTITUDE ENVIRONMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THE US MILITARY WOULD HAVE TO CONDUCT EXTREME OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA STRONGHOLDS IN AFGHANISTAN.<sup>51</sup> AIRCRAFT HAD TO OPERATE AT HIGH GROSS WEIGHTS IN ALTITUDES AND TEMPERATURES FOR WHICH THEY WERE NOT

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<sup>48</sup> Wills, 46.

<sup>49</sup> Wills 46-47 and Williams D. Dries, "Future Counterland Operations: Common Lessons from Three Conflicts" (Fort Leavenworth: US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003), 19.

<sup>50</sup> Franks, 262. The author agrees that a revolution in warfighting has taken place but it is not the result of technology being introduced to the battlefield – see comments on this subject in Chapter 4.

<sup>51</sup> Those extremes conditions are described in Col. Burda's briefing as: high gross weights, pressure altitudes, temperatures, helicopter operations at 10,000 ft, low-level operations between 10-15,000 ft, high altitude airdrops, and talcum powder like dust. Burda, Bruce Col., AFSOC Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned Briefing, 17, 1 Feb 03.

DESIGNED.<sup>52</sup> THE TERRAIN IN CONCERT WITH THE ACCESS DIFFICULTIES OF AFGHANISTAN PROVIDED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNERS.

SECOND, MILITARY EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS HAVE TRADITIONALLY TAUGHT THAT AN ATTACKING FORCE SHOULD HAVE A 3 TO 1 FORCE RATIO ADVANTAGE AT THE POINT OF ATTACK.<sup>53</sup> THE PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE CENTCOM STAFF IN THE OPENING DAYS OF OEF WAS THAT THE US COULD NOT MOVE AN ARMY MATCHING THAT FORCE RATIO AND INITIALLY THOUGHT TO NUMBER 50,000 PERSONNEL INTO AFGHANISTAN IN A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TIMELINE.<sup>54</sup> ACCESSIBILITY WAS A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK FOR CENTCOM PLANNERS. AFGHANISTAN WAS COMPLETELY LAND-LOCKED BY COUNTRIES THAT DID NOT HAVE BASING AGREEMENTS WITH THE US. THIS PREVENTED THE US FROM BUILDING AN INVASION ARMY IN ANY OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.<sup>55</sup> THIS ACCESSIBILITY PROBLEM PROVIDED AN IDEAL ENVIRONMENT FOR A SOF LED WAR IN WHICH SMALL TEAMS OF SPECIAL FORCES WOULD OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY CONDUCTING DIRECT ATTACK OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY CONTINUOUS CAF COVERAGE.

THIRD, THE US DID NOT WANT TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES THE SOVIET UNION MADE IN THE 1980'S WHEN IT INVADED AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN FAILED IN PART BECAUSE THE CUMBERSOME SOVIET RED ARMY TRIED TO ENGAGE A GUERRILLA FORCE EMBEDDED IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. THE SOVIET DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF THE BENEFITS OF MANEUVER WARFARE WHEN ENGAGING A MASSED SUPERIOR FORCE. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY HAD THE ADVANTAGE IN MASS AND FIREPOWER YET LOST TO A MORE AGILE AND ADAPTABLE ENEMY. IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED

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<sup>52</sup> Burda, 17.

<sup>53</sup> Boot, Max, The New American Way of War, *Foreign Affairs* (New Your, July/August 2003, Vol. 82, Iss. 4. 41.

<sup>54</sup> Fifty-thousand troops was the initial estimate proposed by the CENTCOM staff. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 291-292.

<sup>55</sup> Initial estimates CENTCOM planned for was an invasion force of 50,000 troops. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 291-292. Military education institutions have traditionally taught that an attacking force must have a 3 to 1 force ratio advantage. Max Boot, The New American Way of War, *Foreign Affairs*, New York: July/August 2003, Vol. 82, Iss 4. The problem confronting the CENTCOM staff in the opening days of OEF was that the US could not move an Army with those ratios into Afghanistan in anything less than 5 months. Five months is based on the timeline from the fall of the Taliban government to the first conventional led Operation Anaconda.

STATES IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE AFGHAN FIGHTERS WERE NOT AFRAID OF TAKING ON THE US MILITARY.<sup>56</sup> THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA FIGHTERS BELIEVED THE US WOULD FOLLOW IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DEPLOY A MASSIVE GROUND ARMY. THE AFGHAN FIGHTERS WOULD ONCE AGAIN TURN TO GUERRILLA TACTICS AND MANEUVER WARFARE TO DEFEAT THE US MILITARY JUST AS THEY HAD AGAINST THE BRITISH IN THE 1840'S AND THE SOVIETS IN THE 1980'S.<sup>57</sup> MUCH TO THE DISMAY OF THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA LEADERSHIP, THE US MILITARY LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES AS THE SOVIETS.

IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup> TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE US, THE PRESIDENT CAME UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE TO DO SOMETHING. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WANTED REVENGE, BUT THE WORLD COMMUNITY WANTED A LIMITED RESPONSE FROM THE MOST POWERFUL NATION ON EARTH.<sup>58</sup> "US CENTRAL COMMAND OFFICIALS INITIALLY PREDICTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE MONTHS TO PREPARE FOR A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN."<sup>59</sup> THEY ALSO HAD "A PLAN TO INTRODUCE ABOUT 50,000 US GROUND FORCES IF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE FAILED TO MAKE PROGRESS."<sup>60</sup> THIS ESTIMATE ALSO REFLECTED AN ORTHODOX VIEW OF WARFARE THAT FAVORED LARGE NUMBERS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES. ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, THE NEED FOR QUICK ACTION TRANSCENDED DOGMATIC THINKING, FORCING MILITARY LEADERS TO INNOVATE."<sup>61</sup> THE NEED TO BRING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE US DROVE POLICY MAKERS TO A RAPID, LIGHT, AND EXTREMELY MOBILE OPTION IN AFGHANISTAN. TO ACCOMMODATE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S NEED FOR REVENGE AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S DESIRE FOR RESTRAINT, MILITARY FORCE CAPS WERE PUT INTO EFFECT TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF AN AMERICAN ATTACK ON ISLAM.<sup>62</sup> "THE NEED TO ACT QUICKLY, THE INABILITY TO DEPLOY

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<sup>56</sup> After determining Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network was responsible for the terrorist attacks, the United States gave Mullah Omar and the Taliban government of Afghanistan an ultimatum to turn over those responsible for the attacks. The rejection of this ultimatum indicates a lack of concern regarding armed conflict with the United States.

<sup>57</sup> Eric S. Margolis, *War at the Top of the World* (Routledge, New York, 2002), 13-51. The British lost an entire expeditionary force of 16,000 men in 1842. The Soviets deployed a 140,000 man army and still could not subdue the Afghani people.

<sup>58</sup> Wills, 51-52.

<sup>59</sup> Woodward, *Bush at War*, 43.

<sup>60</sup> Woodward, *Bush at War*, 291-292.

<sup>61</sup> Wills, 46.

<sup>62</sup> Wills, 51-52.

A SIZABLE GROUND FORCE IN A TIMELY MANNER, AND THE PRESENCE OF A SURROGATE ARMY DROVE THE US TO INNOVATE.”<sup>63</sup> SOF SUPPORTED BY THE CONVENTIONAL CAF BECAME THE ANSWER. SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WOULD INFILTRATE AFGHANISTAN AND THEN COORDINATE AND DIRECT CAF ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE.

“BEEFED UP BY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND SUPPORTED BY AMERICAN AIR POWER, WE KNEW THAT THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND OTHER TRIBAL MILITIAS COULD DESTROY THE NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA. BUT THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE FIELDIED A TOTAL OF ONLY ABOUT 20,000 TROOPS, ARMED AND EQUIPPED BETWEEN POOR AND FAIR ON A SCALE OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA HAD AT LEAST TWICE THAT MANY FIGHTERS, ALONG WITH MORE TANKS AND APCs, MORE ARTILLERY, AND MORE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. THIS WAS NOT WHAT STRATEGISTS CALL A FAVORABLE BALANCE OF FORCES.”<sup>64</sup>

THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE WAS NOT A HOMOGENEOUS ORGANIZATION, BUT A LOOSE CONFEDERATION OF SEVERAL GROUPS OPPOSED TO TALIBAN RULE. SOF TEAMS WERE INFILTRATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO CONDUCT DIRECT ATTACK MISSIONS ON TALIBAN FORCES AND TO COORDINATE AND CONSOLIDATE ELEMENTS OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND PROVIDED AIR SUPPORT FOR THEIR FORCES. “ON OCTOBER 19, TASK FORCE DAGGER, LATER DESIGNATED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-NORTH, BEGAN INFILTRATING TEAMS OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS AND AIR FORCE COMBAT CONTROLLERS BY MH-47s INTO AFGHANISTAN. “AFTER NINE-ELEVEN WE (SOF) WENT TO AFGHANISTAN LIGHT.”<sup>65</sup> EACH TEAM CONSISTED OF AN OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT ALPHA (ODA), NORMALLY 12 MEN, AND ONE OR TWO COMBAT CONTROLLERS FROM THE 720<sup>TH</sup> SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP.<sup>66</sup> “DURING

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<sup>63</sup> Wills, 53.

<sup>64</sup> Franks, 261.

<sup>65</sup> Lt Col Robert Monarch, interviewed by the author in LtC. Monarch’s office located at Hurlburt Field, Florida on 28 April, 2005. LtC Monarch said that SOF deployed to the Middle East to conduct standard SOF missions in Afghanistan such as “infil of supplies, air drops, air precision strikes with AC-130s, refueling helicopters, seizing airfields, going after terrorists.”

<sup>66</sup> Bruce R. Prinie, and Alan Vick, and Adam Grissom, and Karl P. Mueller, and David T. Orletski, *Beyond Close Air Support; Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2005) 51. The ODA (or “A Team”) is the basic operational element of a Special Forces Group. Each ODA is commanded by a captain, with a warrant officer usually as the second in command. The ten remaining members of the team are experienced noncommissioned officers with expertise in light and heavy weapons, explosives, communications, and medical care. The ODA team is designed to be split, if necessary, into two six-man elements.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, THE ODAs OFTEN CONDUCTED SPLIT OPERATIONS. EACH 12-MAN ODA WAS SPLIT INTO TWO 6-MAN SECTIONS. THE COMBAT CONTROLLERS WERE MORE EFFECTIVE AS A TEAM OF TWO AND IN MOST CASES THE CONTROLLERS HAD TO ROTATE BETWEEN SECTIONS.<sup>67</sup>

“THE SOONER WE HAD THE TEAMS’ COMBAT CONTROLLERS DESIGNATING TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA TARGETS FOR THE BOMBERS, THE QUICKER NORTHERN ALLIANCE TROOPS COULD CLIMB OUT OF THEIR WORLD WAR I-STYLE TRENCHES AND ADVANCE ON THE ENEMY.”<sup>68</sup> “INTEGRATION WITH THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE WAS ONLY SUCCESSFUL AFTER THE ODA TEAMS ESTABLISHED AIRMEN TO CONTROL AIRCRAFT.”<sup>69</sup> INITIALLY, THE MOST ACTIVE AND IMPORTANT GROUPS CONTACTED BY THE ODAs WERE THOSE CONTROLLED BY MOHAMMED QASIM FAHIM, RASHID DOSTUM, AND MOHAMMED ATTAH.<sup>70</sup> “DOSTUM PROVED TO BE THE MOST AGGRESSIVE OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE LEADERS. HE WAS EXTREMELY HOSPITABLE TO TIGER 02, WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY EXPECTED WOULD TIP THE BALANCE IN HIS FAVOR.”<sup>71</sup> “THE AFGHANS WATCHED IN WONDER AS THE SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS SET UP THEIR SECRET WEAPON, A DARK GRAY BOX CALLED A LASER TARGET DESIGNATOR, AND POINTED ITS LENS TOWARD THE SOVIET-MADE TANKS AND ARTILLERY...THE RESULTING BARRAGE OF BOMBS AND TWO DAYS OF FIGHTING CLEARED THE TALIBAN FROM BAGRAM.”<sup>72</sup> “TIGER 02, THE SPECIAL FORCES TEAM SUPPORTING GENERAL ABDUL RASHID DOSTUM

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<sup>67</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 143. The Rand study uses the term Terminal Air Controllers (TACS) when describing the personnel attached to the ODAs. In fact, the personnel attached to the ODAs were not what the Air Force calls TACS, but were Combat Controllers (CCT). To many the distinction may be minor; they both conduct and control CAS missions. But, TACS are assigned to conventional forces and have a completely different (and substantially smaller) mission qualification standard than combat controllers. Combat controllers on the other hand are capable of conducting independent missions or can be attached to other SOF forces as an integral part of an ODA or joint SOF team.

<sup>68</sup> Franks, 289.

<sup>69</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>70</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 50.

<sup>71</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 51. Tiger 2 was the call sign of the Combat Controller attached to the ODA assigned to protect and assist General Dostum. General Dostum’s forces consisted of few hundred horsemen riding with him, who might be reinforced by several thousand militiamen in a particular battle. They were equipped with light-infantry weapons, in contrast to the Taliban, which had tanks, air-defense cannons, and artillery left over from the Soviet occupation. Air power almost immediately made a decisive difference. It devastated the entrenched Taliban forces and demoralized them, while heartening the opposition fighters. After about three weeks of hard fighting, Dostum and Attah entered Mazar-e Sharif on November 9.

<sup>72</sup> Robinson, 157.

FOUGHT ONE OF THE MOST TACTICALLY SKILLFUL AND COURAGEOUS SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS IN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY. FACING DETERMINED ENEMY RESISTANCE, TERRIBLE WEATHER, AND MOUNTING CASUALTIES AMONG THEIR INDIGENOUS TROOPS, THESE GREEN BERETS USED MANEUVER AND AIRPOWER TO DESTROY AN ARMY THE SOVIETS HAD FAILED TO DISLODGE WITH MORE THAN A HALF MILLION MEN.”<sup>73</sup> “LINKING COMBAT AIR CONTROLLERS TO FLIGHTS OF FIGHTER-BOMBERS AND B-52S ORBITING HIGH ABOVE THE BATTLEFIELD HAD PROVEN EVEN MORE LETHAL THAN MILITARY THEORISTS COULD HAVE IMAGINED.”<sup>74</sup> TIGER 01 KILLED MORE TALIBAN IN 48 HOURS WITH CAS THAN THE ENTIRE NORTHERN ALLIANCE HAD BEEN ABLE TO KILL IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR.<sup>75</sup> “OTHER TIGER TEAMS OPERATING IN THE SOUTH USED COALITION AIRPOWER TO POUND THE ENEMY INTO SUBMISSION.”<sup>76</sup> THE MARRIAGE OF SOF AND AIRPOWER BECAME LETHAL FOR THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT AND WOULD SILENCE THE SKEPTICS OF AMERICAN SUCCESS IN THE SO-CALLED GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES.

A MASSIVE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY. THE SUCCESS OF AMERICAN AIRPOWER SUPPORTING SOF WHO IN TURN SUPPORTED THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE BECAME EVIDENT IN THE CAPTURE OF MAZAR-E SHARIF ON 10 NOVEMBER, 2001 AND KABUL TWO DAYS LATER.<sup>77</sup> OF ALL THE MISSIONS SOF COMPLETED IN AFGHANISTAN, “WE COULDN’T HAVE DONE IT WITHOUT CAF, BECAUSE OUR STRIKE CAPABILITY WITHIN SOF IS LIMITED.”<sup>78</sup> “ON DECEMBER 6, JUST 60 DAYS AFTER THE START OF THE WAR, MULLAH OMAR AND SENIOR TALIBAN OFFICIALS ABANDONED KANDAHAR AND WENT INTO HIDING, EFFECTIVELY TERMINATING TALIBAN ADMINISTRATION OF AFGHANISTAN.”<sup>79</sup>

## **The Acid Test**

IT WOULD TAKE ANOTHER THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE CONVENTIONAL COMPONENTS OF THE US ARMY WERE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS IN

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<sup>73</sup> Franks, 314.

<sup>74</sup> Franks, 308.

<sup>75</sup> Col Tom Entwistle, “Operation Enduring Freedom Preliminary Lessons,” Task Force Enduring Look Briefing, chart 22, October 2002.

<sup>76</sup> Franks, 314.

<sup>77</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 49.

<sup>78</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>79</sup> Wills, 55.



AFGHANISTAN. BY MARCH OF 2002 THE US HAD ESTABLISHED A SIZABLE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE CONVENTIONAL ARMY TOOK THE LEAD FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS. EVEN THEN, AS SEEN IN THE POOR INTER-SERVICE COORDINATION AND PLANNING FOR OPERATION ANACONDA THEY WERE STILL NOT PREPARED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.<sup>80</sup> GENERAL FRANKS' AFTER REVIEWING THE PLANS FOR OPERATION ANACONDA STATED THEY WERE "VERY IMPRESSIVE...BUT NOT EXACTLY RIGHT. THESE WERE VERY CREDIBLE PLANS, BUT THEY WEREN'T COMPLETELY COORDINATED. I WAS REMINDED OF DESERT STORM—A PATCHWORK OF DECONFLICTED SERVICE OPERATIONS, NOT A TRUE JOINT EFFORT."<sup>81</sup> THE SHIFT FROM SOF LED OPERATIONS TO CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS SUFFERED FROM LACK OF COORDINATION AND JOINTNESS.<sup>82</sup> GENERAL FRANKS WAS A JOINT WARFIGHTER AND PUSHED JOINT WARFIGHTING HARD. HIS GUIDANCE TO THE SENIOR SERVICE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE IN PREPARING FOR OPERATION ANACONDA IN AFGHANISTAN WAS "THINK JOINT...THINK INTER-SERVICE RELIANCE."<sup>83</sup> THE RESULTS OF OPERATION ANACONDA INDICATE THAT HIS WORDS FELL UPON DEAF EARS AND SERVICE PAROCHIALISM REIGNED.

THE ACTIONS OF THOSE INVOLVED IN OPERATION ANACONDA AND THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATION ARE WELL DOCUMENTED AND SOME CONSIDER IT "THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL BATTLE THE US MILITARY HAS FOUGHT IN RECENT MEMORY."<sup>84</sup> OPERATION ANACONDA WOULD BECOME THE ACID TEST OF CONVENTIONAL LAND AND AIR COMPONENT COOPERATION IN A PITCHED FIGHT.<sup>85</sup> IN THE MONTHS FOLLOWING OPERATION ANACONDA, ACCUSATIONS WERE MADE BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY SENIOR OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Operation ANACONDA was the combined campaign designed to root out al Qaeda and Chechen terrorists from the Shah-I-Kot Valley.

<sup>81</sup> Franks, 378.

<sup>82</sup> Franks, 378.

<sup>83</sup> Franks, 378.

<sup>84</sup> Elaine M. Grossman, "Left in The Dark For Most Anaconda Planning, Air Force Opens New Probe," *Inside the Pentagon* 20 May, 2005. n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/e20021003left.htm>.

<sup>85</sup> General John Jumper, *Operation ANACONDA, An Air Power Perspective*, Headquarters United States Air Force, AF/XOL, 3.

<sup>86</sup> Davis, Major Mark. *Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare* (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies), 2004.

“ABOVE ALL, OPERATION ANACONDA BEGAN WITHOUT A SHIFT IN THE MINDSET FOR OPERATIONS IN THEATER.”<sup>87</sup> “SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES RELIED ON WELL-EQUIPPED CONTROLLERS TO BRING IN CAS AND GROUND-CONTROLLED INTERDICTION STRIKES A FEW AT A TIME.”<sup>88</sup> “WHEN REGULAR US ARMY FORCES PREPARED FOR OPERATION ANACONDA, THE DEFICIENCIES IN GROUND COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR CONTROL HAD NOT BEEN FULLY EXPOSED AND REMEDIED.”<sup>89</sup> “OPERATION ANACONDA HAD AN IMPACT WELL BEYOND ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. FOR GENERAL MOSELEY, WHO REMAINED AS THE CFACC FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM A YEAR LATER, OPERATION ANACONDA TURNED OUT TO BE VALUABLE PREPARATION FOR THAT LARGER OPERATION.”<sup>90</sup>

## **Conclusion**

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN SEPTEMBER OF 2001 AWOKED THE UNITED STATES FROM ITS REST. THE UNITED STATES SOUGHT QUICK PUNISHMENT AND JUSTICE FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE; NAMELY OSAMA BIN LADEN AND HIS AL QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK. IN THE RUSH TO AVENGE THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES ON SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>, AND TO MEET THE UNIQUE ENVIRONMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, THE US INTEGRATED SOF AND CAF ASSETS. THIS INTEGRATION SOON TOOK ON A LEVEL OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND ACHIEVED AN ADVANCED LEVEL OF MANEUVER WARFARE. THIS INTERDEPENDENCE WAS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL AND PROVED LETHAL TO THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT. THE OPERATIONAL SUCCESS OF THE CAF/SOF RELATIONSHIP HAS GENERATED IMMENSE DEBATE ON THE APPLICATION OF WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE AFGHAN MODEL OF WAR.

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<sup>87</sup> Jumper, 115.

<sup>88</sup> Jumper, 115-116.

<sup>89</sup> Jumper, 116.

<sup>90</sup> Jumper, 116.

## **Chapter 3**

# **Operation Iraqi Freedom**

*WE CANNOT WAIT TO ACT UNTIL AFTER ANOTHER DAY LIKE 9/11—OR A DAY FAR WORSE.*

*Vice President Cheney*

FOLLOWING THE CRUSHING DEFEAT OF THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND WITH THE AL QAEDA NETWORK DISMANTLED AND ON THE RUN, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SET ITS FOCUS ON THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS BAATHIST REGIME IN IRAQ.<sup>91</sup> FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, THE RELATIONSHIPS BUILT BETWEEN THE CAF AND SOF COMMUNITIES IN ONE CONFLICT REMAINED INTACT FOR A SUBSEQUENT OPERATION. THOSE RELATIONSHIPS BECAME HABITUAL AND PERSONAL OVER THE YEARS AND HAD OPERATIONAL LEVEL EFFECTS IN THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF OIF. GENERAL FRANKS CALLED UPON THE CAF/SOF TEAM TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT OF IRAQ; TO SECURE THE TERRAIN, AND TO PRESENT A VIABLE THREAT TO THE IRAQI REGIME FROM THE WEST. THIS INTERDEPENDENT JOINT TEAM CAPITALIZED ON ITS INHERENT MANEUVER, SPEED, PRECISION, AND LETHALITY TO CONDUCT NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS AGAINST A LINEAR FOE.

### **Relationships are Important**

IN MAY OF 2001, AN EXERCISE TO DETERMINE THE INTEGRATION FEASIBILITY OF SOF/CAF ASSETS TOOK PLACE IN THE WESTERN US. NEARLY EVERY HELICOPTER, AFSOC REFUELING C-130, C-17 AND MANY OF THE CAF ASSETS, WERE “SHOT DOWN.”

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<sup>91</sup> Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 1.

“IT WAS AN UNMITIGATED DISASTER.” FOLLOWING THAT EXERCISE, MEMBERS OF THE SOF COMMUNITY BEGAN A PROGRAM TO ESTABLISH TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH CERTAIN CAF ASSETS. “THE INTENT OF ESTABLISHING THESE HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS WAS TO ENABLE SOF, FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES, TO PENETRATE AN INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (IADS), CONDUCT ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE, MINIMIZE LOSSES, SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION, AND RECOVER WHATEVER ELEMENT WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MISSION.”<sup>92</sup> “THE RELATIONSHIPS WERE THE KEY.”<sup>93</sup> BUT BEFORE THOSE RELATIONSHIPS COULD BE BUILT THE ENVIRONMENT HAD TO CHANGE.

THAT CHANGE CAME IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS, WHEN USSOCOM BECAME A SUPPORTED COMMAND. “USSOCOM BECOMING A SUPPORTED COMMAND AFTER NINE-ELEVEN MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE.”<sup>94</sup> USSOCOM WAS NOW JUSTIFIED IN REQUESTING CAF SUPPORT FOR GWOT OPERATIONS. THIS ALSO MEANT THAT USSOCOM COULD JUSTIFY HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH ELEMENTS OF THE CAF. IN THE FALL OF 2002, A RETAKE OF THE 2001 EXERCISE TOOK PLACE IN THE WESTERN US. EMPHASIZING HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS, THE SUCCESS OF THIS EXERCISE PROVIDED THE IMPETUS FOR THE FORMATION OF TASK FORCE TIGER. TASK FORCE TIGER CONSISTED OF SIX F-15S, 4 A-10S, 6 F-15ES, 2 EA-6BS, AND 4 F-18S. THE RESULTS OF THIS EXERCISE INITIALLY MIRRORED THOSE OF THE YEAR PRIOR. HOWEVER, ON THE THIRD NIGHT OF THE EXERCISE EVERY ASSET SURVIVED AND THE OBJECTIVE WAS SEIZED. THE TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS MADE ALL THE DIFFERENCE AND WERE BEGINNING TO PAY OFF.<sup>95</sup>

## **Doctrine or Dogma**

EVEN BEFORE THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN WENT INTO HIDING, PRESIDENT BUSH INDICATED A DESIRE TO REMOVE SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER IN IRAQ. ON THE 20<sup>TH</sup> OF NOVEMBER, 2001 PRESIDENT BUSH ASKED FOR A BRIEFING ON

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<sup>92</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>93</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>94</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>95</sup> Monarch interview.

THE EXISTING WAR PLANS FOR IRAQ.<sup>96</sup> ON THE 26<sup>TH</sup> OF NOVEMBER SECRETARY RUMSFELD MET WITH GENERAL FRANKS TO REVIEW OPERATION PLAN (OPLAN) 1003.<sup>97</sup> “THE EXISTING PLAN WAS A REAL HODGEPODGE. RUMSFELD FOUND IT CUMBERSOME; IT PROVIDED EVERY EVIDENCE OF REFIGHTING THE 1991 GULF WAR.”<sup>98</sup> THE EXISTING OPLAN 1003 “CALLED FOR A FORCE OF SOME 500,000, INCLUDING SIX ARMY AND MARINE DIVISIONS.”<sup>99</sup> IT HAD LAST BEEN FULLY APPROVED IN 1996 AND HAD RECEIVED AN UNAPPROVED UPDATE IN 1998.<sup>100</sup>

OVER THE COURSE OF AN HOUR SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND GENERAL FRANKS REVIEWED THE PLAN INCLUDING THE PLANNING PROCESS, ASSUMPTIONS AND THE STALE THINKING BEHIND THEM.<sup>101</sup> “IT WAS, FRANKS THOUGHT, THE CLASSIC KIND OF PLODDING, TANK-HEAVY, BIG-BOMB MASSING OF MILITARY MIGHT FROM ANOTHER ERA. JUST THE THING THAT DROVE RUMSFELD NUTS.”<sup>102</sup> SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S DIRECTION WAS “LET’S PUT TOGETHER A GROUP THAT CAN JUST THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX COMPLETELY...LET’S TAKE AWAY THE CONSTRAINTS A LITTLE BIT AND THINK ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE A WAY TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.”<sup>103</sup> GENERAL FRANKS AND THE CENTCOM STAFF WOULD REVISE AND CUT THE OPLAN 1003 NUMEROUS TIMES OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT YEAR. EACH TIME THEY PRESENTED THE PLAN TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD, THEY WERE TOLD TO CUT AGAIN.<sup>104</sup> EVENTUALLY GENERAL FRANKS AND HIS STAFF WOULD ARRIVE AT OPLAN 1003 V – THE PLAN THAT WOULD GO TO WAR.

ALONG THE WAY THOUGH, GENERAL FRANKS ENCOUNTERED SERVICE PAROCHIALISM REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING PROCESS.<sup>105</sup> DURING ONE OF

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<sup>96</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 35-36.

<sup>97</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 36.

<sup>98</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 36.

<sup>99</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 36.

<sup>100</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 37.

<sup>101</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 37.

<sup>102</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 37.

<sup>103</sup> Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 37. “Traditionally, war colleges have taught that to be sure of success, an attacking force must have a 3 to 1 advantage – a ratio that goes up to 6 to 1 in difficult terrain such as urban areas. Far from having a 3 to 1 advantage in Iraq, coalition ground forces (which never numbered more than 100,000) faced a 3 to 1 or 4 to 1 disadvantage.”

<sup>104</sup> As in OEF, political pressure forced military planners to consider a lighter, leaner option. In OEF, the pressure came from the American people and the international community. In OIF, the pressure came from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

<sup>105</sup> Franks, 275-278.

THE THINK TANK MEETINGS INVOLVING SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND THE JOINT CHIEFS, GENERAL SHELTON ASKED THE SERVICE CHIEFS FOR THEIR THOUGHTS ON THE REVISED PLAN. "ONE AFTER ANOTHER THE CHIEFS OFFERED THEIR VIEWS OF THE CONCEPT...NONE OF WHICH, OF COURSE, MESHED TOTALLY WITH CENTCOM'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT—OR MY VIEW OF JOINT WARFARE."<sup>106</sup> AFTER ENDURING HALF AN HOUR OF THE SERVICE CENTRIC DIALOG, GENERAL FRANKS HAD ENOUGH. HE ABRUPTLY STOOD UP AND WALKED OUT OF THE MEETING LATER COMMENTING, "I HAD NO TOLERANCE FOR THIS PAROCHIAL BULLSHIT."<sup>107</sup>

### **The Operationalization of NLBO**

AFTER WITNESSING WHAT TOOK PLACE IN AFGHANISTAN, "I'D COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE DAYS OF HALF-MILLION-STRONG MOBILIZATIONS WERE OVER."<sup>108</sup> IN AFGHANISTAN "FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE COMBINATION OF SMALL NUMBERS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND AIRPOWER SERVED AS THE FOCAL POINT OF A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL LAND CAMPAIGN."<sup>109</sup> OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM BECAME THE SEQUEL FOR PROVING THIS "NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR."<sup>110</sup> IT WOULD ALSO ADD EVIDENCE THAT NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS UTILIZING SOF AND CAF ARE LETHAL TO AN ENEMY ARRAYED AS A LINEAR FORCE. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM WAS "BUILT ON SUCCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN, WHERE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH ANY FRONT."<sup>111</sup> GENERAL FRANKS PRESENTED SADDAM HUSSEIN WITH WHAT HE TERMED "FIVE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONAL FRONTS."<sup>112</sup> IN DEFENDING HIS PLAN TO SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL HE ARGUED THAT "BY APPLYING MILITARY MASS

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<sup>106</sup> Franks, 275.

<sup>107</sup> Franks, 276.

<sup>108</sup> Franks, 394.

<sup>109</sup> Wills, 57.

<sup>110</sup> Max Boot describes the utilization of SOF in connection with indigenous fighters supported by CAF assets as the New American Way of War in contrast to the traditional attrition style of warfare the United States has planned for in the past. Max Boot, "The New American Way of War", *Foreign Affairs* (New York, July/August 2003, Vol. 82, Iss. 4; pg 41.

<sup>111</sup> Grant, n.p.

<sup>112</sup> Franks, 395.

SIMULTANEOUSLY AT KEY POINTS, RATHER THAN TRYING TO PUSH A BROAD, SLOW, CONVENTIONAL ADVANCE, WE (WILL) THROW THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE.”<sup>113</sup>

### **The Wild, Wild West**

GENERAL FRANKS DIRECTED THE CAF/SOF TEAM TO FIND, FIX, TRACK, TARGET, ENGAGE AND ASSESS (F2T2EA) THE MOBILE SCUD LAUNCHERS BEFORE THEY COULD DRAW ISRAEL INTO THE FIGHT. IN DOING SO, THIS CAF/SOF TEAM WOULD NOT ONLY ELIMINATE THE STRATEGIC THREAT OF THE SCUD MISSILES BUT WOULD ALSO SECURE THE LEFT FLANK OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMY AS THEY ADVANCED TOWARD BAGHDAD.

TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK SOF COMBINED WITH CAF ASSETS ON-CALL OVER WESTERN IRAQ TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY. THIS FLEET OF AIRCRAFT WAS DEDICATED TO SUPPORTING GROUND-BASED SOF PERSONNEL SEARCHING FOR SCUD MISSILES AS WELL AS THE OTHER SOF DIRECTED MISSIONS.<sup>114</sup> ALTHOUGH THE COMBINED FORCES AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (CFACC) WAS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER FOR THE WESTERN DESERT OF IRAQ AND THE COUNTER SCUD MISSION, SOF ASSETS AND CAF ASSETS WORKED TOGETHER IN A TRULY JOINT OPERATION WITH NO APPARENT SERVICE AGENDAS OR PAROCHIALISMS SURFACING. THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL SCUDS DURING THE GULF WAR WAS ENOUGH TO CAUSE SOME IN ISRAEL TO CALL FOR RETALIATORY STRIKES. LIKEWISE THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL SCUDS AGAINST ISRAEL DURING OIF WAS LIKELY TO CAUSE SOME IN ISRAEL TO CALL FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. THE USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION. IF ISRAEL TOOK MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, THE ENTIRE REGION COULD HAVE EXPLODED INTO AN ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. THE USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ISRAEL COULD NOT BE PERMITTED. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WERE TASKED WITH LOCATING AND DESTROYING THOSE SCUDS BEFORE THEY COULD BE LAUNCHED. ADDITIONALLY, SOF WAS TASKED WITH SECURING THE WESTERN BORDERS, PROVIDING A SECOND FRONT IN

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<sup>113</sup> Franks, 395-396. Although it seems unusual for the Commander of CENTCOM to try to convince the Secretary of State on a military operations plan, it was important in this case for several reasons. First, Secretary Powell is the author of the Powell doctrine, which promotes the use of overwhelming military force. Second, Secretary Powell had direct access to President Bush. For these two reasons, Secretary Powell was in a position to undermine the transformational push from Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks.

<sup>114</sup> Robinson, 917 and Monarch interview.

THE WEST, AND CAPTURING OR KILLING KEY LEADERSHIP.<sup>115</sup> “NONE OF THOSE MISSIONS COULD HAVE BEEN DONE WITHOUT CAF SUPPORT.”<sup>116</sup> “THE SOF ACTIVITY IN THE WEST WAS NOT ONLY THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST KINETIC PHASE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; IT WAS ALSO PART OF AN INTRICATE DECEPTION PLAN.”<sup>117</sup> GENERAL FRANKS USED SOF FORCES TO BUILD THE ILLUSION THAT THE ASSAULT ON BAGHDAD WOULD COME FROM THE WEST. “I WANTED THE FIRST SHOTS OF THIS WAR TO BE FIRED IN THE WEST.”<sup>118</sup> EVEN BEFORE THE F-117 ATTEMPTED DECAPITATION STRIKE AT DORA FARM ON THE 20<sup>TH</sup> OF MARCH, NEARLY 300 SPECIAL OPERATORS WERE ALREADY IN IRAQ.<sup>119</sup> OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT MONTH, THOSE 300 MEN WOULD EFFECTIVELY CONTROL TWO-FIFTHS OF IRAQ. THE FORCE RATIOS AND THE UNPARALLELED SUCCESS OF THE SOF DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS PROVIDE EVIDENCE AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LETHALITY OF THIS INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAF AND SOF AND THEIR ABILITY TO CONDUCT NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. THIS RELATIONSHIP GOES BEYOND INTEGRATION. NEITHER THE CAF NOR THE SOF COULD HAVE ACHIEVED CONTROL OVER THE WESTERN DESERT ALONE. INSTANCES OF SOF DIRECTING AIR STRIKES ARE NUMEROUS.<sup>120</sup> THESE STRIKES WERE NOT SIMPLY CAS. THEY WERE AN INTEGRAL AND ESSENTIAL PART OF THE DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY SOF. IT’S NOT A ONE WAY STREET WITH THE CAF SUPPORTING SOF MISSIONS. THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER IN THE HUNT FOR THE SCUDS WAS THEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL “BUZZ” MOSELEY, THE COMBINED FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER. IN THIS CASE SOF SUPPORTED THE CAF BY SEARCHING THE DESERT FOR SCUDS AND THE CAF SUPPORTED THE SOF BY PROVIDING COVER AND OVERWHELMING FIREPOWER TO ENGAGE A LARGER FORCE. AIRPOWER WOULD HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE WITHOUT SOF ON THE GROUND FEEDING TARGET INFORMATION TO THE CAOC. AT THE SAME TIME THOUGH, SOF LACKED SUSTAINED ORGANIC COMBAT POWER AND REQUIRED SUPPORT

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<sup>115</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>116</sup> Monarch interview.

<sup>117</sup> Franks, 434.

<sup>118</sup> Franks, 434.

<sup>119</sup> Robinson, 193.

<sup>120</sup> Of the total CFACC apportionment, support to CFSOCC and suppression of the Iraqi Scud delivery capability accounted for 22.7% of all sorties. Of the 30,542 target nominations, 5,793 were in direct support of CFSOCC operations and/or suppression of Iraqi Scud capability. Over 16,000 CFSOCC/CAS targets were struck. Lieutenant General Michael T. Moseley, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By the Numbers; Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 April 2003.



FROM AIRPOWER FOR THEIR SURVIVAL. IT WAS A TRULY INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP.

THE THIRD SIGNIFICANT ASPECT TO CONSIDER WHEN LOOKING AT THE SOF/CAF INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT LIES IN THE UTILIZATION OF A NON-LINEAR FORCE TO SECURE THE FLANK OF A LINEAR BATTLE. REBECCA GRANT EXPLAINED:

IN PREVIOUS WARS, GROUND FORCES HAVE HAD TO PROTECT THEIR FLANKS ALONG A LONG FRONT, BUT GULF WAR II SAW AIRPOWER ALONE PROTECTING THE FLANKS OF ADVANCING GROUND FORCES, ALLOWING CONCENTRATION OF POWER AND UNPRECEDENTED SPEED OF ADVANCE.<sup>121</sup>

HER POINT IS VALID IN THAT THE FLANK MUST BE SECURED, BUT AIRPOWER ALONE DID NOT SECURE THE FLANKS. IT WAS AIRPOWER AND SOF ON THE GROUND THAT SECURED THE LEFT FLANK OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMY. THE COMBINATION OF DEDICATED AIRPOWER AND SOF WAS SO LETHAL THAT ONE ELEMENT OF SOF CONSISTING OF LESS THAN ONE-HUNDRED MEN USING CAF ELEMENTS KILLED THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE SOVIET-STYLE REGIMENT OF IRAQI ARMOR IN THREE DAYS.<sup>122</sup>

THE STRATEGY OF EMPLOYING THE CAF/SOF TEAM IN THE WESTERN DESERT WAS UNCONVENTIONAL TO SAY THE LEAST. NEITHER THE CAF NOR THE SOF MAINTAINS IN DOCTRINE THE CAPABILITY OF SEIZING AND MAINTAINING CONTROL OF TERRITORY AS THE ARMY DOES. IN THE END, THOUGH, NOT ONLY DID THEY SUCCEED IN SEIZING AND MAINTAINING CONTROL OF THE WESTERN TERRITORY, BUT THEY ALSO PRESENTED A FORMIDABLE FORCE, CONVINCING ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO BELIEVE THE THRUST OF THE INVASION FORCE WAS COMING FROM THE WESTERN DESERT.

### **The Great White North**

ACCORDING TO OPLAN 1003V, THE ARMY'S FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION WAS GOING TO DEPLOY TO TURKEY AND PREPARE FOR AN INVASION OF IRAQ FROM THE NORTH. THAT PLAN HOWEVER, DRASTICALLY CHANGED WHEN TURKEY REFUSED STAGING RIGHTS TO AMERICAN GROUND FORCES. ONCE AGAIN BECAUSE OF POLITICAL

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<sup>121</sup> John A. Tirpak, and Adam J. Hebert, n.p.

<sup>122</sup> The exact size of this SOF element remains classified. Monarch interview.

PRESSURE, GENERAL FRANKS WOULD HAVE TO EMBRACE NLBO.<sup>123</sup> IN THIS CASE, SOF AND AIRPOWER WOULD REPLACE AN ENTIRE INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE NORTH OF IRAQ. “FIFTY SOF ‘A’ TEAMS INFILTRATED NORTHERN IRAQ WITH ORDERS TO COMBINE FORCES WITH THE LOCAL KURDISH PESHMERGA.”<sup>124</sup> THE VERY SAME SOF TEAMS AND COMBAT CONTROLLERS WOULD REPRISÉ THE ROLE THEY PLAYED IN AFGHANISTAN JUST A YEAR AND A HALF PRIOR. THE COMBAT CONTROLLERS CALLED IN AIR STRIKES AGAINST AN ANSAR AL-ISLAM TRAINING CAMP AND AGAINST IRAQI REGULAR FORCES DEPLOYED ALONG THE LINE OF CONFRONTATION WITH KURDISH FORCES.<sup>125</sup> TO CONFRONT THE MASSING KURDISH FORCES, THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP DEPLOYED THIRTEEN IRAQI DIVISIONS TO PREVENT THE KURDS FROM ADVANCING ON BAGHDAD FROM THE NORTH.<sup>126</sup> AS WITH THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, AIRPOWER “ALLOWED THE KURDS TO OVERCOME THEIR LACK OF EQUIPMENT.”<sup>127</sup> “AS A FIGHTING FORCE, THE KURDS’ OFFENSIVE SKILLS WERE NON-EXISTENT, OFTEN CONSISTING OF DIRECT FRONTAL ASSAULTS AGAINST SUPERIOR FIREPOWER.”<sup>128</sup> “KURDISH PESHMERGA (THOSE WHO FACE DEATH) CONSISTED OF 50-70,000 MILITIA TROOPS STATIONED THROUGHOUT NORTHERN IRAQ.”<sup>129</sup> ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IRAQI FORCES FACING THE PESHMERGA POSSESSED ARMOR AND ARTILLERY. “WITH AIR SUPPORT, THE KURDS WERE ABLE TO OVERCOME THEIR LACK OF ARMOR AND INDIRECT SUPPORT...IT WAS AIR POWER THAT ALLOWED THE KURDS TO OVERCOME THEIR LACK OF EQUIPMENT.”<sup>130</sup>

## **To the future**

GENERAL FRANKS IN HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS STATED:

OUR FORCES WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES  
BY INTEGRATING GROUND MANEUVER, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, PRECISION

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<sup>123</sup> The political pressure this time came from a lack of cooperation from the Turkish government. Had Turkey cooperated, General Franks would have reverted to the traditional Army model based on linear battle and would have opened the northern front with the Fourth Infantry Division.

<sup>124</sup> Wills, 58.

<sup>125</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 65-66. Ansar al-Islam was a known terrorist organization based along the Iran-Iraq border with ties to Iran

<sup>126</sup> Wills, 58.

<sup>127</sup> Wills, 59.

<sup>128</sup> Wills, 58.

<sup>129</sup> Wills, 58. Exact numbers are elusive. See Aysla Aydinbas “The Kurdish Dilemma,” *Salon.com*, September 6, 2002, available from <http://www.salon.com/people/interview/2002/09/06/salih>.

<sup>130</sup> Wills, 59.

LETHAL FIRES AND NON-LETHAL EFFECTS. WE SAW FOR THE FIRST TIME INTEGRATION OF FORCES RATHER THAN DECONFLICTION OF FORCES. THIS INTEGRATION ENABLED CONVENTIONAL (AIR, GROUND, AND SEA) FORCES TO LEVERAGE SOF CAPABILITIES TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND ENABLE PRECISION TARGETING SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE SAME BATTLE SPACE.<sup>131</sup>

THE CAF/SOF OPERATIONS DURING OIF DEMONSTRATED A NEW LEVEL OF INTEGRATION AND POTENTIALLY A NEW LEVEL OF MANEUVER WARFARE. THIS INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP MAY BE THE KEY TO TRANSFORMING THE US MILITARY STRUCTURE, PLANNING AND OPERATIONS IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY AND THE INFORMATION AGE. INTERDEPENDENT CAF/SOF OPERATIONS ARE NOT ONLY TACTICALLY VIABLE, BUT ALSO OPERATIONALLY APPLICABLE.

SOME CRITICS MAY ARGUE THAT THE CAF/SOF MISSION IN THE WESTERN DESERT WAS A FAILURE BECAUSE NO SCUD MISSILES WERE DISCOVERED LET ALONE DESTROYED. IN THIS CASE HOWEVER, DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CAF/SOF OPERATIONS SHOULD CONSIDER THE NUMBER OF ENEMY CASUALTIES IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF FRIENDLY FORCES REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THOSE CASUALTIES. ADDITIONALLY, THE EFFECTS OF HAVING A SEEMINGLY CREDIBLE FORCE MANEUVERING INTO A FLANKING POSITION IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE BUT SIMPLE TO UNDERSTAND WHEN THE MAIN FORCE IS ONLY REQUIRED TO ENGAGE HALF THE AVAILABLE REPUBLICAN GUARD DIVISIONS. SIMILARLY, THE BENEFITS OF HAVING A LIGHT, EXTREMELY MOBILE FORCE SECURE THE FLANK OF A RAPIDLY ADVANCING MAIN FORCE PERMITS ADDITIONAL FIGHTING FORCES TO MOVE TO THE FRONT LINES OF THE BATTLE AND DIMINISHES THE NECESSITY TO HOLD FORCES IN THE REAR TO SECURE THE FLANK

TODAY, UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE WHO PUT ASIDE SERVICE PAROCHIALISMS AND EMBRACED NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, ARE BEING DISPERSED AND RE-ASSIMILATED BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICE COMPONENTS THROUGH SCHOOL AND STAFF ASSIGNMENTS COMMENSURATE WITH TRADITIONAL CAREER STOVEPIPES.

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<sup>131</sup> General Tommy Franks, Testimony to Armed Services Committee, 9 July 2003, on-line, Internet, available from [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003\\_hr/franks.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/franks.pdf), 5.

## Chapter 4

# Capturing Non-Linear Battlefield Operations

*VICTORY IS TO THE ARMIES WHICH MANEUVER.*

*Napoleon*

EXPRESSING A TRUE SENSE OF JOINTNESS, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE DR. JAMES ROCHE STATED “WE DELIVERED A TRANSFORMED AIR FORCE TO THE BATTLEFIELD, WITH ARMED PREDATORS, GLOBAL HAWK, BOMBERS WORKING WITH OUR AIRMEN ON THE GROUND TO SUPPORT THE CAS MISSION.”<sup>132</sup> “WE ARE ALL ON A JOINT TEAM, AND OUR AIR FORCE EXISTS TO PRODUCE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS. OUR FUTURE IS CLOSELY TIED TO THE FUTURE OF OUR LAND FORCES. WE HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB MAKING THIS SHIFT. BUT WE CAN DO MORE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR LAND FORCES CONTINUE TO SEE US DEMONSTRATE OUR OBVIOUS COMMITMENT TO AIR-TO-GROUND SUPPORT, BOTH DEEP INTERDICTION AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. WE WILL BE FULLY INTEGRATED WITH THEM, WHETHER THEY ARE ARMY, MARINES, SOF OR COALITION FORCES.”<sup>133</sup> INCREASINGLY, AIR AND SPACE POWER ARE PROVIDING THE “SCALPEL” OF JOINT SERVICE OPERATIONS—THE ABILITY TO APPLY DISCRIMINATE FORCE PRECISELY WHERE REQUIRED.<sup>134</sup>

NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS WARFARE DOES NOT DO AWAY WITH THE NECESSITY OF ARMOR OR OTHER CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BUT IT DOES PROVIDE A FORCE THAT CHANGES TRADITIONAL PLANNING FACTORS SURROUNDING FORCE RATIOS. AN ATTACKING FORCE MAY NO LONGER REQUIRE A 3 TO 1 FORCE RATIO AT THE POINT OF ATTACK TO DEFEAT A DEFENSIVE FORCE. THE NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR IS JOINT MANEUVER NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. TRAINING EXERCISES ARE ESSENTIAL IN DEVELOPING THE RELATIONSHIPS THAT ELEVATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JOINT MANEUVER OPERATIONS. COMBINED AND JOINT TRAINING OF OUR FORCES WAS A

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<sup>132</sup> Roche, James G. Dr. *The Secretary's Vector*, 1 March 2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, available at [http://www.af.mil/media/viewpoints/focus\\_2004](http://www.af.mil/media/viewpoints/focus_2004). 11 November 2004.

<sup>133</sup> Roche, n.p.

<sup>134</sup> Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 17 November 2003, on-line, Internet, 8 June 2005, available from <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/afdc/dd/afdd1/afdd1.pdf>. pg 80.

KEY FACTOR IN OUR SUCCESS DURING OEF AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN OIF AS WELL.<sup>135</sup> TACTICAL INTEGRATION DURING OEF DEMONSTRATED THE LETHALITY OF NLBO AGAINST AN ENEMY FORCE MANY TIMES LARGER THAN ITSELF. DURING OIF, THE SUCCESS OF THE CAF/SOF TEAM OPERATIONS IN OEF INFLUENCED THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION PROCESS. OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTEGRATION WAS DEMONSTRATED WHEN GENERAL FRANKS ASSIGNED THE CAF/SOF TEAM THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURING THE WESTERN DESERT OF IRAQ; THEREBY, SECURING THE LEFT FLANK OF THE LINEAR BATTLEFIELD.

THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO INTEGRATE THESE TWO COMMUNITIES AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF LONG TERM RELATIONSHIPS ESTABLISHED AT THE AIR COMBAT COMMAND AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND LEVELS. ADDITIONALLY, STAFF OFFICERS FOUNDATIONAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF CAF/SOF IN OEF AND OIF SHOULD BE TASKED TO DEVELOP AND ESTABLISH TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF PLANNING. AS GENERAL FRANKS POINTS OUT, "THE DoD/CIA SYNERGY WHICH WORKED WELL DURING OEF WAS BUILT UPON THE INTEGRATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS IN EACH OF OUR HEADQUARTERS WHICH FACILITATED TEAMWORK AND PAID GREAT DIVIDENDS IN IRAQ."<sup>136</sup> THIS STAFF INTEGRATION BETWEEN ACC AND USSOCOM SHOULD BECOME A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT, NOT SOMETHING THAT HAPPENS ONLY IN TIME OF CRISIS. INTEGRATION SHOULD INCLUDE STAFF EXCHANGE TOURS FOR OFFICERS FOLLOWING INTERMEDIATE DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION (IDE) AND SENIOR DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION (SDE). THE INTEGRATION OF STAFF OFFICERS SHOULD PERMEATE THE CHAINS OF COMMAND IN BOTH THE ACC AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITIES. WITHIN ACC, SOF OFFICERS SHOULD INTEGRATE AT THE COMMAND, NAF, AND WING LEVELS. WITHIN THE SOF COMMUNITY, TACTICAL LEVEL INTEGRATION STRUCTURE IS ALREADY IN PLACE THROUGH THE USE OF SPECIAL TACTICS TEAMS AND COMBAT CONTROLLERS. HOWEVER, TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVELS OF INTEGRATION, CAF OFFICERS COMING OUT OF IDE AND SDE SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO LIAISON POSITIONS WITHIN SOF

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<sup>135</sup> Franks, Testimony to Armed Services Committee, 5.

<sup>136</sup> Franks, Testimony to Armed Services Committee, 5.

HEADQUARTERS. ADDITIONALLY, WITHIN EACH COMBATANT COMMAND, A CAF/SOF INTEGRATION CELL SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE J5 AND THE J3 ASSIGNED TO DEVELOP PLANS AIMED AT LEVERAGING THE BENEFITS OF NLBO. THE JOINT AIR-GROUND COMBAT OFFICE AT HEADQUARTERS ACC SHOULD CONSIDER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SPECIAL TACTICS TEAMS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOF OPERATIONS IN OEF AND OIF AND APPLY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO THE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS INTEGRATED INTO THE ARMY COMMAND STRUCTURE.<sup>137</sup> IN THE FUTURE ARMY FORCES WILL DEPEND MORE ON AIR POWER TO HELP THEM SURVIVE AND TO APPLY LETHAL FIREPOWER.<sup>138</sup> GROUND MANEUVER AND AIR ATTACK SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS MUTUALLY ENABLING ELEMENTS IN AN AIR-GROUND TEAM.”<sup>139</sup>

IN DEALING WITH AN AGILE, FLEXIBLE, AND RESPONSIVE ENEMY, THE MILITARY MUST MEET OR EXCEED THEIR ABILITY TO CHANGE OR RISK BEING OUT MANEUVERED. THE MILITARY MUST BE ABLE TO ADAPT AND CHANGE FAST ENOUGH TO OPERATE WITHIN THE ADVERSARY’S OBSERVATION, ORIENTATION, DECISION AND ACTION (OODA) LOOP.<sup>140</sup> CAF/SOF OPERATIONS HAVE THE SPEED, PRECISION, LETHALITY, AND FLEXIBILITY TO OPERATE WITHIN THE ENEMY’S OODA LOOP. CONVENTIONAL FORCES MUST BREAK THE MOLD OF TRADITIONALISM AND CAPTURE THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN NLBO. FAILURE TO CAPTURE AND INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED INTO DOCTRINE TRANSFORMS ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE INTO DOGMA AND RELEGATES THE COMBAT INITIATIVE TO GLOBAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FORCES LOYAL TO THEIR CAUSE. CONVENTIONAL CAS ESTABLISHED IN DOCTRINE IS NOT RESPONSIVE (FLEXIBLE) ENOUGH TO EFFECTIVELY OPERATE WITHIN THE OODA LOOP OF AN INFORMATION-REALM BASED ENEMY.

IN MILITARY DOCTRINE NO LESS THAN IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES, THE TRIUMPH OF NEW IDEAS MUST INVARIABLY CONTEND ALONG THE WAY WITH LIFELONG RESISTANCE,

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<sup>137</sup> Although no formal request has been made, the Army has suggested that two controllers should support each ODA. If every Special Forces group were supported at this level, the Air Force would have to provide 108 controllers per group, for a total of 540 TACs—460 more than are currently available. Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 143.

<sup>138</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 112.

<sup>139</sup> Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 112-113.

<sup>140</sup> The late Colonel John Boyd’s description of “the OODA Loop is now used as a standard description of decision making cycles.” For a more detailed explanation of Col. Boyd’s OODA Loop see <http://www.mindsim.com/mindsim/corporate/ooda.html>

PARTICULARLY FROM THOSE WHOSE PRODUCTIVE CAREERS HAVE COMMITTED THEM TO AN OLDER TRADITION.<sup>141</sup> THOSE WHO DISLIKE THE NOTION OF NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS ARE CAUGHT IN THE COLD WAR ERA. TO THEM, NEW TECHNOLOGIES SUCH AS THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) AND GPS GUIDED AND STANDOFF WEAPONS HAVE NOT CHANGED THE BATTLEFIELD SIGNIFICANTLY. THEY ARGUE THAT THE DAYS WHEN AN A-10 REQUIRED A VERBAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TARGET AND TARGET ENVIRONMENT FROM THE IP TO TARGET MAY BE GONE FOR NOW, BUT WHEN TECHNOLOGY FAILS OR THE ENEMY IS MORE ADVANCED, THEN THE DESCRIPTION WILL ONCE AGAIN BE NECESSARY. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY DON'T WANT TO ACCEPT THAT TODAY'S BATTLEFIELD IS FLUID AND INFORMATION BASED. IT RELIES UPON GPS AND SPEED. IT INCLUDES B-52'S AT 40,000 FEET. MARKING A TARGET, IP TO TARGET, AND TALK ON DESCRIPTIONS ARE ANTIQUATED AND TIME CONSUMING CHAFF IN AN EVER CHANGING INFORMATION BASED COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. CURRENT CAS DOCTRINE IS BASED ON A SYSTEM OF MECHANIZED LINEAR WARFARE WITH ITS FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED DURING WWII. FOR EXAMPLE, CURRENT CAS DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES CALL FOR TERMINAL AIR CONTROLLERS TO PUT AIRCRAFT INTO A HOLDING ORBIT WHILE PROVIDING A NINE-LINE BRIEFING. THIS NINE-LINE BRIEFING IS TIME CONSUMING AND FOR THE MOST PART NOT APPLICABLE WHEN AIRCRAFT EMPLOY GPS GUIDED MUNITIONS.<sup>142</sup> RECENT CONFLICTS DEMONSTRATE THAT 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY WARFARE IS NO LONGER BASED ON MECHANIZED OR LINEAR WARFARE. THE INFORMATION AGE HAS CHANGED THE NATURE OF WARFARE FROM A LINEAR BATTLEFIELD TO A NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD.

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<sup>141</sup> Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2000), 304.

<sup>142</sup> The nine-line briefing consists of (1) the initial point (IP), (2) the heading /offset, (3) the distance to the target from the IP in nautical miles, (4) the target elevation (in feet above mean sea level), (5) the target description, (6) the target location (in latitude/longitude, coordinates, offsets or by visual description), (7) the type of marking used (if any), (8) the location of friendly forces (from the target), and (9) the egress route. Prinie, Vick, Grissom, Mueller and Orletski, 136 and Hawkins, James A., Major General, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*, Joint Publication 3-09.3, Washington DC, September 3, 2003, on-line, Internet, 9 June 2005 available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_09\\_3.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09_3.pdf).

## **CAS comes to the Information Age**

THE COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE FOR IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT TO CONVENTIONAL ARMY UNITS FLOWS THROUGH THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL /ARMY AIR GROUND SYSTEM (TACS/AAGS). THIS SYSTEM IS PREDICATED AND BUILT UPON LINEAR BATTLE FOUGHT ON LINEAR BATTLEFIELDS. LINEAR BATTLES AND BATTLEFIELDS ARE BECOMING A THING OF THE PAST. JUST AS THE INDUSTRIAL AGE GAVE WAY TO THE INFORMATION AGE, SO MUST LINEAR BATTLES GIVE WAY TO NON-LINEAR BATTLES. LINEAR BATTLEFIELDS WERE THE CONSTRUCT OF INDUSTRIAL AGE ARMIES; NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELDS ARE THE CONSTRUCT OF THE INFORMATION AGE. DOCTRINE AND THE TACS/AAGS SYSTEM SHOULD REFLECT THE CHANGING NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD. IN THE PAST TWO CONFLICTS SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THE CONVENTIONAL COMBAT AIR FORCES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. THEY DEVELOPED, ADAPTED, AND INSTITUTED AN AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM THAT MATCHED AND SUPPORTED THE NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. THE AIR FORCE AND ARMY STAFFS AND LEADERSHIP SHOULD PUT ASIDE THEIR SERVICE PAROCHIALISMS AND AGENDAS AND EMBRACE JOINT OPERATIONS SUPPORTING 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY NON-LINEAR MANEUVER WARFARE.

### **Maneuver and Non-Linear Battlefield Operations**

CURRENT AIR FORCE DOCTRINE STATES:

“MANEUVER PLACES THE ENEMY IN A POSITION OF DISADVANTAGE THROUGH THE FLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMBAT SPACE. AIR AND SPACE POWER’S ABILITY TO CONDUCT MANEUVER IS NOT ONLY A PRODUCT OF ITS SPEED AND RANGE, BUT ALSO FLOWS FROM ITS FLEXIBILITY AND VERSATILITY DURING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS. MANEUVER, LIKE THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFENSIVE, FORCES THE ENEMY TO REACT, ALLOWING THE EXPLOITATION OF SUCCESSFUL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS AND REDUCING FRIENDLY VULNERABILITIES.”<sup>143</sup>

A MANEUVER FORCE EXHIBITS FOUR COMMON ATTRIBUTES. IT COMES INTO DIRECT CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY AND SHOCKS IT. IT EXERTS INFLUENCE OVER ENEMY UNITS AND TERRAIN. IT DENIES OR COMPELS

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<sup>143</sup> AFDD1, 17 November 2003, 23.



BATTLE. FINALLY, IT GAINS AND EXPLOITS A POSITION OF ADVANTAGE, FORCING THE ADVERSARY TO REACT OR BE ATTACKED AT A DISADVANTAGE.<sup>144</sup> AIR FORCE DOCTRINE STATES THAT “AIR AND SPACE FORCES ARE AN INHERENTLY MANEUVER FORCE IN THEIR OWN RIGHT.”<sup>145</sup> AIRPOWER CAN GREATLY ENHANCE THE JOINT THEATER CAMPAIGN INDEPENDENTLY AND IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER MANEUVER FORCES.<sup>146</sup> AS GENERAL PATTON STATED, “BATTLES ARE WON BY FIRE AND BY MOVEMENT. THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVEMENT IS TO GET THE FIRE IN A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS PLACE ON THE ENEMY. THIS IS FROM THE REAR OR FLANK.”<sup>147</sup> “WHILE MANEUVER IS THE KEY TO VICTORY, IT IS MANEUVER OF THE UNITS OF FIREPOWER AND NOT OF THE MASSES OF CANNON FODDER. WE MUST LEARN TO DEPEND FOR SUCCESS, NOT ON THE PHYSICAL WEIGHT OF THE INFANTRY ATTACK, BUT ON SKILLFUL OFFENSIVE USED IN COMBINATION OF ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MANEUVER.”<sup>148</sup>

ACCORDING TO REBECCA GRANT, “AIR AND SPACE POWER MADE THE CONDUCT OF GULF WAR II NOTHING LESS THAN A NEW STYLE OF WARFARE WHICH WILL SET THE TONE FOR ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY.”<sup>149</sup> “OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ABOLISHED THE WARFARE MODES OF THE 19TH AND 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES THAT INVOLVED SETTING UP SEQUENTIAL FRONTS, ATTRITION WARFARE, AND LINES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ENEMY. INSTEAD, GULF WAR II TOOK PLACE ON FIVE SEPARATE FRONTS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND FLUIDLY, REMOVING VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE ENEMY’S INITIATIVE.”<sup>150</sup> “THIS STYLE OF WARFARE IS SO NEW THAT WE DON’T HAVE GOOD WORDS FOR IT YET,”<sup>151</sup> GRANT EXPLAINED. “WE TEND TO TALK ABOUT WHAT IT ISN’T: NONLINEAR, NONSEQUENTIAL, NONCONTIGUOUS OPERATIONS. WHAT THAT ALL IS SAYING IS THAT THERE IS A CHANGE IN HOW WE BUILT THE FRAMEWORK OF VICTORY.”<sup>152</sup> “NO ADVERSARY CAN MASS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT FACING CERTAIN DESTRUCTION.”<sup>153</sup> “AS A NATURAL EXTENSION OF ITS LETHALITY, AIRPOWER HAS BECOME THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF ECONOMY OF FORCE.”<sup>154</sup> “OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM DEMONSTRATED THAT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRECISION AIRPOWER, FEWER GROUND TROOPS ARE REQUIRED DURING THE COMBAT

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<sup>144</sup> Robert P. Givens, “Turning the Vertical Flank; Airpower as a Maneuver Force in Theater Campaign.” *The Cadre Papers* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, June 2002), 15.

<sup>145</sup> AFDD1, 17 November 2003, 41.

<sup>146</sup> Givens, vii.

<sup>147</sup> Givens, 7.

<sup>148</sup> Givens, 1.

<sup>149</sup> Tirpak, John A. and Hebert, Adam J., n.p.

<sup>150</sup> Tirpak, John A. and Hebert, Adam J., n.p.

<sup>151</sup> Tirpak, John A. and Hebert, Adam J., n.p.

<sup>152</sup> Tirpak, John A. and Hebert, Adam J., n.p.

<sup>153</sup> Wills, 8.

<sup>154</sup> Wills, 8.

PHASE OF MODERN WAR.”<sup>155</sup> CLEARLY TROOPS ON THE GROUND ARE NEEDED, BUT “IT IS VITAL THAT AMERICA DECIDE HOW MANY AND WHAT KIND OF BOOTS TO DEPLOY.”<sup>156</sup>

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OUR MILITARY INTO THE INFORMATION AGE HINGES ON CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL THOUGHT AND DOCTRINE ESTABLISHED DURING THE INDUSTRIAL AGE AND SOLIDIFIED DURING THE COLD WAR. SERVICE PAROCHIALISMS STAND IN THE WAY OF A NEW AGE IN MANEUVER WARFARE. BATTLES OF THE FUTURE WILL BE WON BY THE FORCE CAPABLE OF OPERATING ON A NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD. NLBO CAPITALIZES ON THE SPEED, PRECISION, AND LETHALITY OF THE CAF/SOF INTERDEPENDENT OPERATIONS TO OPERATE WITHIN AN ENEMIES OODA LOOP. NLBO HAS PROVEN ITSELF EFFECTIVE AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR. NOW IS THE TIME TO CAPTURE IT IN DOCTRINE AND FORMALIZE HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS SUCCESS ARE ASSIMILATED BACK INTO THE STOVEPIPES OF CONVENTIONAL THOUGHT.

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<sup>155</sup> Wills, 9.

<sup>156</sup> Wills, 9.

## **Conclusion**

IN THIS THESIS, I ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS AND HOW TO ENCOURAGE PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN CAF AND SOF UPON WHICH SUCH OPERATIONS MAY DEPEND. I USED THE CAF/SOF INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP THAT DEVELOPED DURING OEF AND WAS FURTHER REFINED DURING OIF AS THE MODEL FOR NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. USING THIS MODEL TO UNDERSTAND MANEUVER WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE, I HIGHLIGHTED THE NECESSITY TO FURTHER INTEGRATE THE CAF/SOF COMMUNITIES AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL AND TO CODIFY IN DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THESE TWO COMMUNITIES.

## **Lesson Learned?**

EACH TIME THE CAF AND SOF JOINED FORCES AND BECAME AN INTERDEPENDENT TEAM THEY WERE, AFTER THE MISSION, DISBANDED AND REINTEGRATED BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES. EACH EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATED AND INTERDEPENDENT CAF/SOF OPERATIONS STUDIED DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SUCCESSFUL MISSIONS RELIED UPON PRE-MISSION PREPARATIONS AND REHEARSALS. THE MISSIONS THAT DID NOT PLACE A HIGH EMPHASIS ON PERMISSION REHEARSALS AND RELATIONSHIPS EITHER FAILED OR HAD TO RELY ON INDIVIDUAL BRAVERY AND INGENUITY TO OVERCOME UNFORESEEN EVENTS. INDIVIDUAL RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRE TIME TO DEVELOP. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRE TIME AND SENIOR LEADER APPROVAL TO DEVELOP. UNFORTUNATELY, TIME IS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE IN A WORLD FILLED WITH TERRORISTS AND ROUGE NATIONS SEEKING WMD.

## **From the Past, the Future**

VISIONARIES CAPTURE AND EMPLOY LESSONS FROM THE PAST TO IMPACT THE FUTURE. TO CAPTURE AND EMPLOY LESSONS FROM THIS THESIS, LEADERS MUST LAY ASIDE SERVICE PAROCHIALISMS AND DEVELOP A NON-LINEAR MINDSET NECESSARY TO TRANSFORM THE MILITARY FROM AN INDUSTRIAL AGE LINEAR FIGHTING FORCE TO AN INFORMATION AGE NON-LINEAR FIGHTING FORCE. SECOND, LEADERS AND STRATEGISTS SHOULD INCORPORATE INTO DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY THE NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS MODEL DEVELOPED BY THE CAF/SOF TEAM IN OEF AND OIF. THIRD, LEADERSHIP AND STAFFS SHOULD ESTABLISH THE HABITUAL TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAF AND SOF ORGANIZATIONS NECESSARY TO FURTHER DEVELOP NLBO. FINALLY, SENIOR LEADERSHIP SHOULD INTEGRATE THE STAFFS OF ACC AND USSOCOM WITH SENIOR OFFICERS FROM EACH COMMUNITY.

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